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1.Introduction 
1.1 Postmodern mindset 
There has been increasing talk of communities and the sense of community in 
recent times and how it relates to culture. This discussion has both local and 
global dimensions, and at times the local and global become intertwined in ways 
that make it difficult to refer to them as separate spheres of action.1 Globality is 
making its presence felt locally, just as local realities make their presence felt 
globally.2 Because of this intertwining, culture is increasingly becoming 
understood as the mediator between its two dimensions, which serves in 
highlighting culture’s communicative properties.3 
Clifford Geertz noted in 1983 that we seem to be living in a time when 
something is happening to the way we think about the way we think. This shift is 
distinctive and general enough to the degree that it suggests, “an alteration in the 
principles of mapping cultural realities is underway.”4  
Thirty years on, distinctive shifts in the ways we think are sometimes 
reflected in somewhat strange, yet none the less exemplifying ways in the voices 
of the younger generation. According to the entertainment section of Helsingin 
Sanomat, artist Petri Nygård made the history books with his latest music video 
titled “Sober Day”.5 An introductory dialogue highlights the message of the song. 
Petri’s friends have gathered together in order to get drunk and ask: “where is 
Petri?” Petri responds from the other side of the world: “where am I? I’m drunk. 
Where are you at?” It is evident in these lyrics, that what is deemed of immediate 
significance for Petri with respect to one’s temporal whereabouts is ironically not 
one’s location or one’s community, but instead one’s immediate mindset.  
                                                
1 As an extreme example, the recent school shootings have been explained from a cultural 
perspective as an individual identifying with a cultural script. This does not imply that the nature 
of such tragic incidents can be attributed in their driving force to the cultural transcript, but the 
transcript served as a channel of and for self- redemption. Kiilakoski 2009,  6-7.   
2 This is evident most recently in the insufficiency voiced towards multicultaralism in Europe. Past 
policy, referred to by David Cameron as state multiculturalism (implying multiculture is also a 
political ideology) has been labelled inadequate in accomodating the challenges put forward by the 
cultural implications of globalization. Merkel labelled the implementation of multicultaralism as 
“an utter failure” and demanded immigrants learn the local language as intrinsic part of the 
solution inorder to intergrate into society better. Mercel’s comments in particular place a lot of 
weight on language in the hope of remedying the current situation. BBC 2011, BBC 2010. 
3 In this paragraph culture is potrayed as a monolithic whole. This offcourse does no justice to the 
complexity of culture in its immense diversity, but is a starting point inorder to get a grip on what 
culture means in this study. 
4 Geertz 1983, 20. According to Wainright, Lindbeck is most deeply indebted to Clifford Geertz’s 
understanding of cultural systems in his cultural-linguistic effort to usher in a post-liberal age in 
theology. Wainright 1988, 122. Also Volf 1996, 50; DeHart 2006, 68 for similar assessments.  
5 HS.fi 2010. 
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The question posed by Petri’s friends is interpreted by Petri not as ‘where 
am I?’ or ‘with whom am I?’, but rather ‘how am I?’. What one understands as 
most constitutive to the lens through which one sees one’s situation in the world 
seems to override where one actually is with respect to more conventional ways of 
understanding reality. One could argue that Petri assumes as the foundation of his 
communal identity his externally induced, and in this particular case, rather 
sensational experience of being drunk. The sense of community is therefore not 
derived from where one is, but from how one is. Deciphering the militancy of 
Nygård’s satire is not relevant to this thesis, but understanding the root causes of 
his genre of social criticism is telling of the challenges theology faces in this day 
and age for the purposes of this study, because Petri’s message evidently thrives 
in the age of postmodernity, at least within its offspring.  
Matti Amnell writes in Kirkko&Kaupunki that the all-encompassing 
relativism advocated by postmodernism is problematic. He points to one 
manifestation of such in its radical form when he recollects spotting a young girl 
on the street with the message “I am my own God. I do what I want.” printed on 
her back. According to Amnell, her conclusive statement encapsulates the spirit of 
three central claims within radical postmodernism. Firstly God is assumed dead 
because it no longer means anything. People, on the other hand, are essentially 
dead because we are nothing more than the end products of our cultures. 
Communicative texts are dead, because language cannot grasp reality since reality 
does not go beyond language, which consequently signifies the irrelevance of 
history.6 
In her statement to society, the young girl identifies with the logical 
conclusion of radical postmodernism in its totalistic relativism. If all we have is 
relativism, then really all we have is relativism, which justifies a holistic 
indifference towards reality because it is understood that we exist apart or, in a 
sense, in absolute difference from a true reality. Because of this (assumed) 
fundamental or radical lack of reality beyond ourselves, reality becomes 
constituted by a state of mind, which consequently authorises one’s personal state 
of mind to be the real real.7 In short, if the young girl is declaring how things 
stand, then Nygård is applying it and putting it into practice in precisely a manner 
which leaves little to question: he authoritatively does what he wills, which is to 
                                                
6 Amnell 2010, 4-5. 
7 Amnell 2010, 4-5. 
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alters the state of his ‘authoritative’ mind.8 Whether or not the irony is intentional, 
their actions/statements implicitly pose a serious question to society and they 
cohere in their nihilistic underpinning: what really am I supposed to care about?9 
 Heikki Kirjavainen makes an educated guess in his assessment of 
postmodern theology with respect to the spiritual core of postmodern culture: “it 
has been born to serve as a means for interpreting the identity crisis of the western 
individual.” One constitutive factor of this identity crisis is an inbuilt relativism 
that is accredited largely to post World War Two French philosophy. It created a 
philosophical and cultural atmosphere that concerned itself with criticizing of the 
universal theory of knowledge and abandoning epistemological foundationalism.10 
In its most radical form, it did not satisfy itself with criticism of the above, 
but rather took on the deconstruction of our understandings of reality by bringing 
into question the very referential nature of the medium with which we articulate 
such understanding, meaning language itself. In other words it brought along a 
perspective that disabled language from going beyond language when attempting 
to define reality in any definitive sense. Language becomes reality in itself, 
because language cannot extend to anything but itself and therefore the very 
notion of reality becomes purely subjective. Taken to its logical conclusion, it 
would imply that we lose our perspective on reality, because language, which is 
necessary to articulate our perspective on reality, has lost its capacity to articulate 
any relevance in determining reality11. Reality becomes what you or I make of it, 
leaving us with the reality of an unlimited number of realities. If this is the case, 
applicability still remains an issue, unless we are content, as Kirjavainen says: “to 
                                                
8 This type of postmodernistic attitude towards reality finds a critical structural correlate in 
Sammeli Juntunen’s description of postmodern spirituality. In its quest for a sensible and 
meaningful existence in the midst of postmodern pointlessness, postmodern spirituality is created 
for the self by oneself. It does not require externally rendered divine revelation concerning the 
essence of reality and its structure, nor does it require a salvific narrative. For the modern 
individual an authentically lived out ‘self’ is spiritual enough. Juntunen 2010, 226-227. 
9 This hypothetical conclusion resonates in a subtle way with Berger’s description of the modern 
situation of the individual in that our fate has become that of choice in a rather forceful manner. It 
leaves one asking “how it really was” concerning the origins of what is available. In other words 
since characteristic of this new situation is having to choose between traditions i.e. the situation is 
something more like untraditional traditionality, the question of what traditions really 
communicate has become a focus of curiostity. See Berger 1980, 11-12, 126. Petri’s and the young 
girls statements to society, if understood hypothetically as criticisms of this situation, is “what 
does any of this really have to do with me?”. In other words, what is one’s relationship to the 
diversity available through traditions. 
10 Kirjavainen 2003, 168-169.  
11 Kirjavainen 2004, 168-169, 178-181. Timo Eskola points out that according to research done 
from a philosophical perspective,  Derrida’s understanding of deconstruction was very theoretical 
and concerned itself with the principles of language and because of this it is not as such applicable 
to reality without trivialising the very theory. Eskola 2008, 110.  
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be whatever”. If one is, it implies a sense of indifference towards reality. If not, 
which is the more sensible response according to Kirjavainen, it implies we take 
this perception of different realities as real challenge and therefore need to try and 
account for its consequences by encountering the reality of difference.12  
It may be worth mentioning in order to disclose one’s positioning, that 
personal motivation towards venturing into a cultural-linguistic understanding of 
religion in this study is linked to personal experience.  Moving back to Finland at 
the age of sixteen, having spent nine years in Botswana, brought about (in 
retrospect) a third culture experience, which falls under the more general category 
of cross-cultural experiences. Thirdness refers in its functional aspect to a 
space/medium characterised by behavioural traits derived from the need to adapt 
to changes in one’s environment/culture. Adapting is basically an interactive 
process of relating to one’s environment. It is characterised by forming a space to 
gain an understanding of what constitutes the general nature of behaviour, which 
presents itself as out of sync with one’s assumptions. The basic reason for this 
need of space is that what is constitutional in people’s thinking often correlates 
with what is taken for granted. People are, to use an analogy, fish-in-water when it 
comes to their respective societies and cultures in that they, to a lesser or greater 
extent, cultural-linguistically belong to it. People metaphorically speaking breathe 
their culture. This implies that the constitution of society is in everyday situations 
silent knowledge, and because this silent knowledge is often thought of as a given 
(in other words, its origins are not consciously thought of), it is not only silent but 
more often than not in the form of latent knowledge and therefore needs to be 
deduced. This process of deduction is regulated (guided) by certain principles that 
seem to persist irrespective of where one is coming from.13 Third culture is a 
regulator of an adaptive process of deduction, and it is this regulatory 
characteristic of behaviour to which individuals of cross-cultural experience feel a 
heightened sense of belonging to. One can think of it as a temporary home of a 
kind.  
  
1.2 Aim, source, method, previous research and limiting of 
scope 
                                                
12 Kirjavainen 2004, 181. 
13 For a widely cited definition and analysis of third culture which empirically speaks on the behalf 
of the above description of third culture see Pollock&Van Reken 2009, 13, 23-26. 
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The aim of this thesis is not concerned with seeking theologically substantial 
answers as such to questions possibly implicitly posed by Petri and the young girl, 
which is within the greater task of theology and social ethics. Rather, and on a 
more technical level, this study is primarily and distinctly concerned with the 
sense of immediacy and validity with which Petri and the young girl, and to 
varying degrees any and everyone, are off any opinion in the first place. More 
precisely it is concerned with the corporate matrix of our opinions, convictions 
and questions and how the prior functions as a regulator of the latter. In relation to 
Petri and the young girl’s hypothetically implicit questioning, this study focuses 
on how one arrives at one’s conclusion in order then to be able to focus on what 
drives the substance of these conclusions i.e. to find their home.14 If ecumenical 
engagement or theology were to be perceived as a hockey game, this study is 
primarily interested in the time-out and how its insights can be put to use.15 
In order to gain a perspective into the dynamics of this corporate reality at 
work in a limited theological context, the aim of this thesis is to examine the 
understanding of community in George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine- Religion 
and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 1984 (ND). In order to meet this aim, it is 
necessary to examine also how Lindbeck understands the relation between the text 
and the world which both meet in a Christian community. As a final note 
concerning the aim of this study, one also takes into consideration Lindbeck’s 
own description of his work. According to him the ND is not a systematic 
presentation of his cultural linguistic theory in that it does not move in a step-by-
step demonstrative sequence, which would be characteristic of a linear and 
systematic approach, but is, in its heuristic intent, circular in its advocating for the 
cultural linguistic perspective into reality. Referring to Wittgenstein, Lindbeck 
says that the persuasiveness of his argumentation depends on the illuminating 
power of the whole. “It may be that if light dawns, it will be over the whole 
                                                
14 The title of this study “ the home of hearing” is meant to read from a cultural-linguistic 
perspective as the source from where one receives what one essentially witnesses to. One can have 
in this sense numerous homes with respects to different aspects of life and thought, (for eg. a 
philosophers thougths can be traced to numerous influences or paradigmatically to modernity as an 
example). In this study it is meant to read as the home/source which is given primacy over all other 
homes. For example Petri Nygård gives primacy to hedonism,  the young girl to radical 
postmodernism. The first is at home when drunk, the latter is at home within all-encompassing 
relativism etc. Generally speaking what one takes in is what one puts out. 
15 The intention of this time-out comparison is emphasize that Lindbeck’s model is born out of 
frustration towards the way in which doctrines are presumed to function in reality. Likewise if all 
is not going well in a hockey game, timeouts are taken inorder to modify tactics. 
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landscape simultaneously.”16 Thus at its best this present study is an attempt to 
describe how this persuasiveness relates to Lindbeck’s understanding of 
community.  
It is important to note that Lindbeck does not derive his understanding of 
community ultimately from the nontheological import, which is present in the 
ND. His use of Geertz, Wittgenstein and Berger to name a few is according to 
himself probationary. He is using them to test out their viability in communicating 
his theological understanding of community.17  
The ND is credited with hearing the paradigmatic message of 
postmodernism and relaying it into theology in the form of a cultural linguistic 
understanding of religion and regulative rule theory of doctrine.18 Even though the 
theory of religion and doctrine put forward in the ND is designed for the purposes 
of ecumenical dialogues with the intent of enabling its counterparts to understand 
the nature of their doctrinal agreements (and likewise persisting disagreement on 
an institutional level) better, its usefulness rests on its general plausibility as a 
perspective into the communal nature of the realities in which we dwell.19 It thus 
seeks to provide a framework for encountering and exploring the realities where 
common ground is lacking in that very respect. 
In order to serve the above intent, the cultural-linguistic perspective seeks to 
understand the corporate matrix within which ecumenical dialogue takes place. It 
is Lindbeck’s assertion that a cultural-linguistic perspective enables to make better 
sense of what is actually going on in these dialogues, especially in accounting for 
the nature of their results.20 In this sense, his concern is more with the discovery 
                                                
16 ND, 10. Here Lindbeck implicitly states his heuristic intentions which might explain why he 
often generalizes to the extent that many commentators of Lindbeck critisize him for not doing 
justice to what he is generalizing.  
17 Lindbeck 2004, 15. 
18 Knitter 2002, 178. According to Amnell, Lindbeck is a moderate postmodern theologian in that 
he has adopted certain thoughts from postmodernism which characterize to a degree the structure 
of his thinking. On the whole, however, his thinking cannot be considered postmodern since 
according to Lindbeck first order religious discourse can possibly make ontological truth claims. 
Amnell 2010, 205, 208. 
19 ND, 8. 
20 This is important inorder for assisting the implementation of ecumenical agreements. In 
Lindbeck’s proposal, a paradigm which allow’s ‘doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation’ is 
understood as intrumental for facilitating the reception of doctrinal ageements. Lindbeck asserts 
that this principle, which would be necessary for the theological implementation of reconciled 
diversity, is not conceivable through presently dominant and established perpectives which 
according to Lindbeck “at their best resort to intellectual gymnastics to the extent that they are 
unpersuasive.” ND, 15-17. This is ofcourse not a substantial argument in itself, but highlights 
Lindbeck’s pragmatic filters, i.e. it needs to work without having to resort to a too complex an 
intellectual exercise in attempting to satisfy the semantic requirements of paradigms Lindbeck sees 
as problematic to begin with. If this perspective is left unconsidered, it will lead to criticism of 
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of a more truthful nature of the situation, not the substantial truth that is 
thematically under debate in these situations. Lindbeck therefore construes a 
cultural-linguistic perspective into reality. Lindbeck’s basic concern in the ND is 
according to DeHart not to engage in theological debate about how to interpret 
specific doctrine, but rather to bring forth a framework within which these debates 
can be carried out in a way that makes disagreement mutually understandable.21 
This does not mean however that Lindbeck is indifferent towards the ontological 
truth of the issues under engagement, as this study will attempt to disclose.  
As secondary sources I use an interview with Lindbeck and an article from 
the Thomist.22 The reason for choosing the interview with Lindbeck as a 
secondary source is the basic outline he puts forward on his own thinking. It 
offers a subjective look at how Lindbeck understands the formation of his basic 
guiding principles concerning doing theology. These can be considered important 
in the present thesis because of the way the ND can also be perceived to reflect 
Lindbeck’s thinking on the whole. Michalson writes, that the ND represents a set 
well-considered insights that have been patiently arrived through a long-term 
effort during the course of Lindbeck’s career up until the release of ND. 
Underlying perspectives which have been difficult to detect in Lindbeck’s work 
up until the ND, come together in the ND in a way that open up the overall picture 
of Lindbeck’s theological work. In other words it states explicitly the logic, which 
has played a largely implicit role in his earlier work.23 With respect to legitimising 
the focus on the understanding of community in this thesis, Marshall assesses that 
despite the vast array of topics Lindbeck has engaged with over the years, most of 
what he has written has to do with the different aspects concerning Christian 
communal identity: practical, sociological, doctrinal and theological.24 Other 
secondary sources listed in the bibliography are to render clarity on central issues 
relating to the aim of the study.  
The method for investigating Lindbeck’s understanding of community in 
ND is systematic analysis. How systematic analysis is applied unfolds in the 
structuring of the thesis.  Chapter 1.3 will be a description of the context of 
                                                                                                                                 
Lindbeck’s assessment of hybrid theories of doctrine, as it has to quite an extent. One example see 
McGrath 1990, 32-33.  
21 ND, 91. DeHart 2006, 70.  
22 Lindbeck cites this article as an important clarification to his theory of truth presented in the ND 
which he maintains is widely disregarded in criticisms of his analysis of truth. Lindbeck 2009, 139 
ft10. 
23 Michalson 1988, 109. 
24 Marshall 2009, x. 
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thought from within which Lindbeck imported the main sociological, 
anthropological and philosophical ideas, which qualify his cultural-linguistic 
perspective from that perspective.25 Because of the vastness of this discussion, it 
will simply highlight the factors, which are deemed useful with respect to the aim 
of this study. Chapter 2 will be a description of Lindbeck in his own theological 
context of postliberal theology which he is above all associated with. It will 
describe the emergence of Lindbeck and the general nature of the ongoing process 
of reception of ND and its central ideas. The intention of Chapter 3 is to describe 
the integral nature of Lindbeck’s understanding of a religious community. Chapter 
4 will focus on an evidently problematic feature in Lindbeck’s understanding of 
community, as identified by his critics, which is how Lindbeck’s understanding of 
community understands the relationship between the text and the world.  The 
intention of this chapter is to get a clearer understanding of how the cultural-
linguistic understanding of community goes about accounting for this relationship. 
It will be explored with the help of those voices who have specifically criticized 
his understanding of community as a cultural-linguistic system as insufficient for 
understanding the relationship between world and text.  Chapter 5 will be a 
concluding reflection. 
The cultural-linguistic pool of ideas selectively introduced in chapter 1.2 is 
a short elaboration on the nontheological import of the ND. A far more extensive 
exploration of these ideas would be necessary if one wanted to understand to what 
extent Lindbeck’s perspective is specifically qualified by these ideas. But that 
would be a separate question in itself, because Lindbeck’s use of these ideas is in 
his own understanding probational, meaning he is testing their viability for his 
main argument, which is not derived from them, but rather his use of these ideas 
is a derivative of his theological argument. In other words this study will not focus 
on how right or wrong Lindbeck is in the application of these ideas, but rather on 
how these ideas function in Lindbeck’s use of them. The main purpose of chapter 
1.2 is to help the reader orientate towards a cultural-linguistic mindset. 
Previous research on Lindbeck is vast and from a diverse variety of 
perspectives. One can find a comprehensive listing of about 300 articles, reviews 
and books that deal with Lindbeck in one way or another in Lindbeck 2009, 152-
                                                
25 It is important to note that although Lindbeck makes heuristic use of these non theological ideas, 
they are not in Lindbeck’s opinion any way foundational for his argument and could be omitted 
without materially affecting it. Lindbeck 2004, 15. They qualify understanding his perspective, not 
the perspective itself. 
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165.26 Taking into consideration that Lindbeck’s understanding of community is 
implicit27 in most of his work, it is logical that most of what is written about him 
also concerns his understanding of community to a lesser or greater extent. 
Because of this integral nature of community to Lindbeck’s thinking, literature 
that deals with or utilises Lindbeck holistically has been assumed most useful.  
Paul DeHart’s “The trial of the Witnesses” (2006), Kevin Vanhoozer’s “The 
Drama of Doctrine” (2005), “The nature of Confession, Evangelicals and 
Postliberals in Conversation”28, Reinhard Hutter’s “Suffering Divine Things” and 
Alister Mcgrath’s “The Genesis of Doctrine” (1990) are all notable literature in 
this respect which have been utilised in this study.    
Finnish research on Lindbeck is mostly notably as a corporate effort. He is 
mentioned or elaborated on in passing whilst dealing with thematic issues and 
from this perspective it seems his thinking is relatively well known. The most 
recent evidence of this is Olli-Pekka Vainio’s “Beyond Fideism” (2010). It cites 
Lindbeck to quite an extent and provides in passing a useful summary of 
Lindbeck’s realism. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. Reijo 
Työrinoja analysed the main tenets of ND in 1991 in an article titled 
“Systemaattinen teologia ja uskonnollinen kieli” which is summarised in “Oppi, 
kahle vai kalleus” 2000. Also Sammeli Juntunen, Timo Eskola and Tuomo 
Mannermaa have outlined the main tenets of the ND. See Juntunen 2004, Eskola 
2008 and Mannermaa 2000 in bibliography. More recently Daniel Nummela has 
compared Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach to Lindbeck’s cultural-
linguistic approach in his master’s thesis titled “Opin hermeneutiikkaa- kanonis-
kielellisen ja kulttuuris-kielellisen hermeneutiikan keskeiset erot”. It has also been 
published in Iustitita 25, 2009. Most recently Kaija-Liisa Lindberg has written a 
dissertation for a higher pastoral degree titled “George A Lindbeckin kulttuuris-
kielellisen opinkäsityksen ja siitä käydyn keskustelun tarkastelua” (2010). Matti 
Amnell explores Lindbeck as one representative of moderate postmodern 
theology in his doctoral thesis titled “Uskonto ilman uskontoa” (2010).  
In the light of the above, Lindbeck’s understanding of doctrine has been 
covered in recent research and therefore the aim of this study limits itself to 
exploring Lindbeck’s understanding of community. Questions concerning 
                                                
26 One can also find a bibliography of all Lindbeck’s writing (a list of over 200 articles, books and 
reviews) since 1945. Lindbeck 2009, 141-152. 
27 See p.25 in this study. 
28 Apart from including an essay (Lindbeck 1996) as a secondary source for this study, Volf’s 
article “Theology, Meaning and Power” is the only other essay utilised from this book.  
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doctrine, truth and revelation are deeply interrelated to Lindbeck’s understanding 
of community, but they are dealt with only to the degree that they serve in 
enhancing Lindbeck’s understanding of community. Also perspectives concerning 
Lindbeck’s ecclesiological and ecumenical thinking are only elaborated on when 
it is of direct heuristic value to point out confluences to them or when they reflect 
the cultural-linguistic understanding of community in their respective logic. 
 A theological motive for this study is the scandal of Christian division. For 
practical purposes this scandal can be viewed as a complex process of learning 
away from visible unity, which inhabited the Church for its first millennium. 
Theologically, this learning away from unity is constituted by sin if we take into 
account Jesus’ prayer of unity.  It also allows one to assume that dividing sin has 
been at work from the founding moment of the church. Therefore it needs to be 
acknowledged that sin is in a real way inherent in the doctrinal decisions 
undertaken by the church in its history at least in the role that communally 
authoritative doctrine functions in forming, upholding and projecting divisions 
amongst Christians. The ND attempts to offer a useful perspective for 
understanding this reality.  
1.3 Community as a cultural system and linguistic medium 
This chapter is to serve as an introduction into the anthropological, sociological 
and philosophical currents of thought, which served as the pool of ideas from 
where Lindbeck channelled the nontheological aspects of his cultural-linguistic 
understanding of religion and regulative understanding of doctrine for his model. 
It will concentrate on the relevant aspects of Clifford Geertz, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Peter Berger with respect to the aim of this study. On Lindbeck’s 
own account, he uses Geertz as a semiotic instantiation of a wide range of ideas 
originating from Weber, Durkheim, Hegel and Marx. Lindbeck’s own knowledge 
of these ideas is chiefly second hand through Peter Berger.29 According to 
Vanhoozer, Lindbeck is particularly indebted to Geertz’s cultural anthropology 
and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.30 The insights chosen are chosen on 
the retrospective assumption that they are useful in understanding the general 
nature of Lindbeck’s understanding of community which is the aim of this study. 
An understanding of communities as cultural systems and linguistic 
mediums requires understanding communities as cultural systems and linguistic 
                                                
29 Lindbeck 2009, xxx. ND, 20, 27ft10. 
30 Vanhoozer 2005, 10ft30. 
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mediums. This is not meant to read as a tautology, but rather states that a 
community is how it is understood to be, which requires understanding 
understanding.31 These two words together illustrate in a nutshell what perceiving 
community as a cultural system and linguistic medium is concerned with: a 
cultural system is a mode of understanding amongst its members, and that 
understanding is understood by its members through a linguistic medium which 
operates of and for the cultural system in question.  
The general validity of this double ‘of and for’ aspect is evident in for 
example this very paragraph: the reader, being part of the reader community (two 
being enough), would not be able to make sense of understanding understanding 
if one were not able to firstly identify English vocabulary and secondly utilise 
English grammar. The seamless interdependence of these two aspects of 
understanding something said or written is what ultimately communicates an 
understanding of understanding understanding from the writer to the reader in 
this context.32  
The investigation of this interdependence is according to Geertz generally 
referred to as hermeneutics: the study of how and based on what principles, we 
interpret what we interpret. For Geertz, central to hermeneutical investigations in 
its attempts to penetrate modes of thought amongst people, is moving back and 
forth between two questions: “What is the general form of their life?” and “What 
exactly are the vehicles (transmitting mediums) in which that form is embodied?”. 
This process, which seeks to relate the whole to its parts and vice versa, is 
commonly referred to as the hermeneutical circle. Accordingly, it is a process in 
which interpretations lead to understandings and understandings lead to 
interpretations. In this sense it holds a methodological realism, not a principle. But 
because of precisely this, it is inversely a methodological principle in the way of 
an open-ended principle for determining principles. This type of categorising is 
explicitly present in Geertz’s Local Knowledge- Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology 1983.  He writes:  
 
“One will not find [in these essays] very much in the way of ‘theory and methodology of 
interpretation’ .. .. what one will find is a number of actual interpretations of something, 
                                                
31 Geertz 1983, 5. 
32 To emphasize the main point here: if for example one were to apply indonesian grammar to 
english vocabulary in the above case,  understanding understanding would read as the plural of 
understanding i.e. understandings.Therefore it is the grammar which renders the intended content 
of the language. Language and grammar are in this sense meaningful when both correspond with 
the intended message.  
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anthropologizing formulations of what I take to be some of the broader implications of those 
interpretations, and a recurring cycle of terms –symbol, meaning, conception, form, text... culture- 
designed to suggest there is a system in persistence, that all these so variously aimed inquiries are 
driven by a settled view of how one should go about constructing an account of the imaginative 
make-up of society.”33  
 
What this type of hermeneutical process leads to is not a communion with 
the form of life or mode of understanding under study, but is according to Geertz 
more aptly described as something along the lines of “grasping a proverb”, 
“catching an allusion”, “seeing a joke” or “reading a poem”.34 It is more a 
question of ‘getting it’, than actually getting into it. Or more accurately it is more 
a question of seeing it, not being one with it. There seems to be a strong 
connotation in Geertz’s point concerning understanding, that understanding 
ultimately correlates with distancing oneself from a mode of understanding in 
order for a more genuine perspective to emerge. Perspective and understanding go 
hand in hand in complementing each other. 
Clifford Geertz sums up a shift in academic culture, which he saw breaking 
through in the enormous amount of genre mixing35 in intellectual life in his time 
as follows: “Something is happening to the way we think about the way we 
think”36 This quote reveals a key presupposition which is central to social 
anthropology, namely the question of why we think the way we think in the first 
place. In other words, the origin of our perspectives into our thought is where a 
shift is identifiable because the answer to the ‘why?’ is perceived to be changing. 
Analysing religion as a cultural system can be understood as expanding the 
conceptual arsenal within which the study of religion is undertaken by extending 
it into its cultural dimension. More precisely this implies that the analysis of 
religion focuses on the cultural dimension of religious analysis in order to widen 
the scope of historically and scientifically established and thus authoritative 
traditions with respect to the study of religion. This is done for the purpose of 
loosening the conceptual constraints to enable more meaningful analysis of 
religion.37  
Geertz’s understanding of culture is semiotic. This is rooted in 
understanding man as an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
                                                
33 Geertz 1983, 5. 
34 Geertz 1983, 5, 68-70. 
35 For example philosophical inquiries looking like literary criticisms (Sartre), ideological 
arguments cast as histographical inquiries (Edward Said).  
36 Geertz 1983, 20. 
37 Geertz 1973, 88-89. 
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spun. Culture is understood as these webs and therefore an analysis of culture can 
only be an interpretive one in search of meaning. In line with this, Geertz defines 
culture more specifically as a context within which social events, behaviours, 
institutions or processes can be intelligibly- that is thickly38- described. It is not a 
power to which these can be causally attributed.  With respect to the cultural 
dimension of religion, culture denotes “historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in 
symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop 
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life”. As a result, Geertz defines 
religion as follows:39   
“A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long lasting 
moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”40 
 
Geertz correlates a system of symbols with a model. The term ‘model’ has 
two senses or aspects: an ‘of’ sense and a ‘for’ sense. This intrinsic double aspect 
implies that religion serves the community as a model for a reality and as a model 
of a reality. This implies that religion acquires meaning by shaping the members 
of the community as well as being shaped by its members. Motives can be 
understood as liabilities or persisting tendencies within the structural identity of a 
religion. They are goal orientated and become meaningful when paying reference 
to the goal they are understood to be aiming for. Moods on the other hand are 
totalistic and are understood in reference to where they are coming from. It is an 
immediate reaction like worrying if nuclear holocaust is perceived to be looming. 
In other words we are the recipients of moods in contrast to motives, which are 
received inbuilt tendencies towards something, for example, success.41 
According to Geertz, man depends on symbol systems with a dependence so 
great that it is decisive for his identity as a creature. In terms of religion, this 
implies that man depends on religion in order to make life sufferable, not to avoid 
suffering, because life inevitably confronts one with suffering. It provides a 
cultural linguistic framework which makes the enduring of life with its up and 
downs possible. This it does by providing a comprehension of life and how to 
                                                
38 “Thick description” means describing something within its meaning-giving context to the extent 
that it renders the meaning of that something. For example as is the case with idioms. See Geertz 
1973, 6-10. 
39 Geertz 1973, 5,14,89. 
40 Geertz 1973, 90. 
41 Geertz 1973, 93-98. 
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comprehend life within this comprehension. It serves in a sense as a cosmic 
guarantee that there is meaning to life.42  
Concerning religious belief, Geertz is clear and explicit when it comes to the 
role of authority in religion. The basic axiom underlying all religious perspectives, 
whereby a perspective is a mode of seeing in the extended sense of discerning, 
apprehending, understanding or grasping, is that in order for one to know one 
must first believe. For this reason, Geertz requires a clear recognition of the fact 
that religious belief does not involve a “Baconian induction” from everyday 
experience, but rather a prior acceptance of authority, which transforms that 
experience.43   
For Geertz the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve as an all-
embracing system of thought from which its way of relating to culture flows from. 
Concerning the study of religion, Geertz advocates a two-stage operation: 
analysing the religion as a system of meanings embodied in the system which 
makes up the distinct religion after which these systems can be related to social-
structural and psychological processes. Geertz is dissatisfied with the fact that it is 
the latter stage with which contemporary social anthropological work concerning 
religion is mostly occupied with. In doing so it neglects and therefore takes for 
granted precisely what needs the most clarification and explanation: religion as a 
cultural system.44 Cultural systems can also be thought of as language games or 
forms of life, hence we turn to Wittgenstein. 
‘Language games’ is a key notion in Wittgenstein’s later thought. Although 
he did not expand the idea in a systematic fashion, it has been enormously 
influential. Its central message is that words do not carry meaning on their own, 
but their meaning depends on the context of their application in different contexts. 
Therefore there are as many meanings for a word as there are language games 
within which it can be used. Languages games can also be thought of as forms of 
life. This implies that in order to understand the meaning of a language specific to 
a certain form of life, one needs to some extent participate in it. Meaning of words 
is learned through their use in forms of life. Meaning cannot be determined from 
outside this form of life. Language games can be understood to refer to entire 
cultures or sub-cultures such as politics, education or theology, but likewise to 
                                                
42 Geertz 1973, 99,104. 
43 Geertz 1973, 109-110. 
44 Geertz 1973, 123-125. 
 16 
more foundational systems such as a web of belief. Complexities inherent to these 
games vary according to their scope.45 
The possibility of private languages, or rather their impossibility, is 
distinctly Wittgensteinian. According to Bloor’s investigation of Wittgenstein, a 
private language would be a vocabulary of pure introspection for recording the 
innermost aspects of our experiences. They would refer to immediate private 
sensations, which are not as such conveyable by words implying that another 
person could not understand a private language of introspection. For example, 
pain refers to a sensation of pain, but it does not capture the meaning of pain 
apparent in the private realm of existence, or anything specific about the pain 
other than what is understood by pain in the public realm e.g. a distressing 
sensation of some sort. A private language would have to differ from normal 
languages if it were to actually exist.46 
Wittgenstein attacked the notion of private languages because he wanted to 
prove that there is a perpetually binding link between the mental life of the 
individual and the public world. Proving this link has significant consequences for 
understanding the nature of morality as well, because if a private language is an 
impossibility, then that is the case with private morality as well. Bloor 
understands the core of Wittgenstein’s attack to be that their is actually no such 
thing as a private understanding of a sensation in the first place (and therefore no 
private language which would have mediated it) because its assumed correctness 
is an illusion of the mind. If one impresses on oneself a given sensation as pain in 
order to be able to make the right connection in the future, it is done by assuming 
some sensation as a point of reference for pain, which, if understood as private, 
renders the correctness of the conviction irrelevant and beyond any realm of 
evaluation. Whatever seems right is right only because it is assumed to be right on 
account of a private language.47 Most importantly, it neglects the significance of 
what is guiding one’s application of the word pain to sensations of a certain type 
to begin with.  
This leads Wittgenstein to conclude, that introspective discourse is a public 
institution just like ordinary language games. Expressions based on our inner 
experience are not really based on inner experience, but rather on socially 
acceptable ways of attempting to interpret the inner self. This further leads Bloor 
                                                
45 Stiver 1996, 59-64. 
46 Bloor 1983, 54. 
47 Bloor 1983, 54-56, 64. 
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to conclude that according to Wittgenstein we have no immediate self-knowledge 
and consequently no resources for accounting for purely private objects and 
experiences.48 In order to sum the above perspective of Wittgenstein, the source of 
subjective experience is in language, which originates from outside our minds i.e. 
from the socially constructed collective mind of the community. Society provides 
us with an ‘objectified’ understanding of subjectivity which consequently renders 
our own subjectivity unobjectifiable because we cannot objectify what objectifies 
since it is not a private enterprise or investigation, but socially constituted. Our 
modes of subjectivity are linguistically mediated (implying they are social to their 
core) which correlates with the implicit aim of Wittgenstein in that objectivity, 
just as rationality, are actually something that are socially forged for our benefit in 
the process of constructing a form of collective life. Objectivity is communal 
capital rather than objective (or real) objectivity, and constructing it is the life vein 
of the community. Objectivity is therefore subjective at the level of the 
community, but objective to the individual participating in that community.  As a 
result, apparent universals become relative and we become responsible for those 
aspects of reality, which previously we felt responsible to. This sort of 
‘objectified’ subjectivity, according to which objectivity is acknowledged as a 
subjective goal, can be associated with socialized subjectivity from a sociological 
perspective.49 How this dynamic works from a sociological perspective is where 
we turn to next. 
Lindbeck cites Peter Berger and Thomas Luchmann in the ND as his 
sources for describing religion as an overarching integrating and legitimating 
frame of reference for the socially constructed worlds that human beings inhabit.50 
A central tenet of their cultural understanding of religion with respect to the 
transmission of religion has to do with the internalisation of reality. Berger and 
Luchmann understand society as an ongoing dialectical process between the 
aspects of externalisation, objectivation and internalisation. In other words, 
society consists of receiving and giving objectifying/objectified understanding. To 
be in a society is to participate in the dialectic between these three aspects. One 
internalises the objectified content in order to inhabit it and inevitably externalises 
it in living out one’s life as a part the given society.  No-one, however, is born into 
this state of participation, but everyone is born with a predisposition towards 
                                                
48 Bloor 1983, 64. Stiver 1996, 66. 
49 On the basis that the apparent objectivity is a side product of socialization. See  
50 ND 27. 
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sociality, which enables one to become a member of society by participating in 
the dialectic.51 
The above societal dialectic implies that it is through a process of 
socialization that individuals become members of a given society. When for 
example an individual x born into society Y, he/she is inducted into participation 
in the societal dialectic. The first step in this process is that of internalisation. In it, 
individual x goes through a process of being related to and relating to the 
significant other52 in order to gain understanding of this other and in order to 
apprehend the world of the other as a meaningful and social reality.53 This 
complex process leads to an ongoing mutual identification between individual x 
and the other, which as a result of socialization, is no longer an other, because 
now x and Y live in the same world. They live in the same social construct of 
reality by participating in each other’s being. Of most relevance is that there is a 
mutual identification in existence between x and Y. When this level of 
internalisation has been achieved one can, according to Berger and Luchmann, 
begin to talk of individual x as a member of society Y. 
Berger and Luchmann speak of socialization leading one eventually (as a 
result of the interaction with significant others) to identify with the generality of 
others. This generalized other, abstracted from the reality internalised through 
significant others, is the given society in its general and encompassing 
significance to the individual. It is only as a result of this generalized 
identification of the other that one’s own self-identification attains stability and 
continuity. After this point, one’s identity is no longer dependent of the specific 
others one has encountered along the way, but is now subjectively perceived to be 
an  “identity in general”. This new identity has an inbuilt capacity to incorporate 
within itself the various perspectives acquired through separate processes of 
internalisation.54 At this point it could be said that one becomes a generally 
representative member of a society. 
                                                
51 Berger & Luchmann 1966, 149. Berger&Luchmann cite Weber for their conception of 
understanding the other. Lindbeck too lists Weber as a source of his ideas/logic for ND. 
52 The significant others in an individuals life are the principal agents for the maintenance of one’s 
subjective reality. i.e. those close enough whose inevitable responsibility it is to represent ‘the 
other’ to the individual and socialize one into a society. B&L 1966, 66, 154, 170-171.  
53 Ibid 150. 
54 Ibid 1966, 152-153. This correlates with Berger and Luchmanns understanding of language with 
respect to tradition in that language “objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available 
to all within the linguistic community, thus becoming both the basis and the instrument of the 
collective stock of knowledge.. .. language provides the means for objectifying new experiences, 
allowing their incorporation into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the most 
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This process has an integral connection to language. 
 
The formation within consciousness of the generalized other marks a decisive phase 
in socialization. It implies the internalisation of society as such and the objective 
reality established therein, and, at the same time, the subjective establishment of a 
coherent and continuous identity. Society, identity and reality are subjectively 
crystallised in the same process of internalisation. This crystallization is concurrent 
with the internalisation of language. Indeed, for reasons evident from the foregoing 
observations on language, language constitutes both the most important content and 
the most important instrument of socialization.55  
  
This crystallization of the generalized other in the consciousness of the 
individual establishes a symmetrical relationship between objective and subjective 
reality. The higher the degree of symmetry, the more successful the socialization 
has been.56 The objective corresponds with the subjective hence making them 
translatable through the language which initially constitutes the formation of this 
symmetry. However, Berger and Luchmann stress that the symmetry between 
objective and subjective reality cannot be complete to the extent that the 
difference between the outer and inner aspects of reality becomes erased in some 
way. This incompleteness subsists because the two aspects of reality are not 
coextensive: there can never be more subjective reality than what the objective 
already holds and makes available. In other words and despite the symmetry, no 
individual will ever internalise the totality of what has been objectivated as reality 
in one’s own society.57 In this sense, there is a distinction that can be made 
between society and the ‘world’ the society represents. All the members of a 
society constitute the ‘world’ or total reality of a society, but the world never 
constitutes in its totality the identity of an individual member. Therefore the 
objective maintains the role of a leading partner in the dialectic between society 
and its members and in this sense individuals as members of a society reflect the 
nature of society but are never total manifestations of this society.58 The nature of 
a society or community is therefore not reducible from any single member, which 
also verifies the obvious: a community cannot consist of only one even with 
                                                                                                                                 
important means by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations (sedimentation: a 
cultural deposit, so to speak, which for eg. in Christianity would correlate with the depositum fidei) 
are transmitted in the tradition of the collectivity in question. Ibid 85-86.  
55 Berger&Luchmann 1966, 153. (italics added) 
56 Ibid 183. 
57 This is simply because the contents of socialization are determined by social distribution of 
knowledge. A child does not choose to which parents one is born and therefore it is the parents 
who set “the rules of the game”. This leads the child to internalize the world of his parents, not out 
of choice, but as the only conceivable world there is which is why the world of childhood is 
“massively and indubitably real”, in that it is the first world one knows and in this sense serves as 
one’s basic frame of interpretation. Ibid 1966, 153-155. 
58 ibid 153-154. 
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respect to knowledge of a community. Communal knowledge has an 
unsurpassable dimension, which is only available to a community, not the 
individual. 
Balancing out the leading role of objective reality in identity formation is 
the realism that there are always elements in subjective reality that are not of 
social origin, for example the awareness of one’s own body. The immediacy of 
this prior awareness is what facilitates the socially learned apprehension of one’s 
body. From this perspective the individual always has a basic intuitive 
understanding of oneself as being both outside and inside society, which too 
cannot dissolve. This tension highlights the reality that the symmetry described 
above is by nature dynamic because it needs to be produced and reproduced in the 
very act of creating it. Berger and Luchmann describe this relationship between 
the individual and the objective world as an “ongoing balancing act”.59   
It can be seen in the above that central to socialization is the instrumental 
role of language. It enables one to become an effective member of a society by 
gradually coming to possess the world which one as a subjective and identifiable 
self inhabits.60 Language is in its function constitutive to the general identity of 
any given society. Languages uphold, create and modify the symbolic universes 
they transmit. For this reason it is important to acknowledge clearly, that the 
symbolic/semantic universes are social products and therefore understanding their 
meaning lies in the history of how they came to the point at which they are now. 
This emphasis on the socio-historical origins is especially important because of 
the sense of inevitability and totality societies present themselves with as a result 
of socialization.61 In other words the assumed authority built-in as a result of 
understanding being a social construct,62 -i.e. every member in a sense posits the 
society with its authority-63, does not justify the authority given to it, but looking 
to the sociohistorical origins can serve in either verifying or falsifying tenets of 
this authority. Even though the above description of internalisation is concerned 
mostly with primary socialization, and not with the more complex processes of 
secondary socialization, which nonetheless follow the same general logic, the 
                                                
59 ibid 154. 
60 ibid 157. 
61 ibid 115. 
62 Because of the nature of socialization, one acquires cohesive wholes through language without 
reconstructing their original process of formation. They are valid because they are. I.e. their 
authority is a given. ibid 87. 
63 See Geertz for a useful perspective of this, in a sense ‘borrowed’, authority. Geertz 1973, 90. 
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significance of the world internalised through primary socialization persists as a 
home world throughout life. i.e. as the basic mindset (or base world according to 
Berger and Luchmann) which does not alter easily. One’s home is always in the 
past.64  
The past is present in the core of our identities in the form of traditions. 
Naturally some traditions carry more weight than other. How we interpret history 
is enforced with more tradition than how we have our coffees. But with respect to 
religious traditions, Berger emphasises that at the core of the phenomenon of 
religion is a set of highly distinctive, yet on the other hand domesticated, 
experiences. 
 
A religious tradition, with whatever institutions have grown up and around it, exists 
as a fact in ordinary, everyday reality. It mediates the experience of another reality, 
both to those who have never had it and to those who have but who are ever in 
danger of forgetting it. Every tradition is a collective memory. Religious tradition is a 
collective memory of those moments in which the reality of another world broke into 
the paramount reality of everyday life. But the tradition not only mediates the 
religious experience; it also domesticates it.65 
 
Religious tradition is, according to Berger, the careful management of 
exceedingly dangerous human experience. Religious experience is by nature such 
that it breaches the reality of ordinary life. This rupturing of reality has its origins 
in what is understood and referred to as sacred. Despite the sense of 
overwhelming certainty with which these experiences can affect the perspective 
one has of reality, they are difficult to sustain in the long run. In order to keep 
them real, these experiences become embodied in traditions.  These traditions 
mediate the experience to others, which eventually leads to the institutionalising 
of these traditions in order to establish a relationship between the given 
knowledge and the conventional reality of a society. In this sense religion follows 
a general feature of human existence, which is to embody human experience in 
tradition. As was evident in the description of socialization earlier, this is 
necessary for continuity, which is inherent necessity to any possible existence of 
social life. 66 Traditions and institutions alike are different forms of 
                                                
64 Berger & Luchmann 166, 182. For example in a school context, the content transmitted via 
secondary socialization requires the teacher to “bring home” ,to the best of one’s ability, the 
content being taught. The home refers to the general mindset constituted largely by primary 
socialization which needs to be taken into account in order to ease the internalizing of new 
knowledge and skills.  See Ibid 162-163. When this logic is transferred to a theological context, it 
highlights the necessity of contextualisation in communicating a religious message to the extent 
that it is an imperative. 
65 Berger 1980, 49. 
66 Berger 1980, 43,46-47,50. 
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objectifications through which the identities of societies are transmitted in the 
ongoing dialectic between internalisation, objectivation and externalisation, which 
constructs reality. 
Summing up, religious experience becomes embodied in traditions, 
languages and symbol systems, which are all historically established. Hence a 
perspective emerges whereby religion is understood as a human projection 
because it is communicated in human symbols. But the very act of communicating 
it, which essentially brings about the projection, is motivated by an experience in 
which “a metahuman reality is injected into human life”. This leads Berger to 
conclude that any inquiry into a nature of religion must as its final objective have 
the discovery of the core experience which constitutes that religious tradition in 
the full knowledge that this objective cannot be fully attained, because the 
inquirer is always embedded within a specific sociohistorical context and as a 
result confined to approximations concerning the articulation of the core 



















                                                
67 Berger 1980, 52, 142. According to Lindbeck, Berger’s thoughts with respect to religion bear a 
close resemblance to Schleiermacher, even though Berger’s own theory of culture need not restrict 
Berger to an experiental-expressive account of  religion. ND 20, 28 fn18. 
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2. Lindbeck and postliberal theology 
This chapter will describe the emergence, reception and position of Lindbeck 
within postliberal theology. 
The ‘intuitive’ roots of Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic perspective into 
religion go back to his own roots. He was born in 1923 to Lutheran missionaries 
in Luoyang, China, where he spent the first seventeen years of his life. For the 
first twelve of those he was largely cut off from the outside world due to sickness 
of some sort, which kept him at home in a somewhat isolated existence. These 
years of his life he describes as ones spent in an invalid’s bubble, in which he was 
free to create an understanding of China, which appealed to him.68 
He recounts certain aspects of Chinese culture that captivated his 
imagination and thus left lasting impressions on him. One significant such were 
the continuities of thought and culture present in Chinese history, the physical and 
literary evidence of which fascinated his young imagination. One exposure in 
particular exemplified these continuities in their far-reaching implications. He was 
deeply impressed by the personas of the local pastor and his wife in that they were 
Christian and yet simultaneously profoundly Confucian in their manners. These 
experiences among others implanted certain ways of thinking in him, which he 
compresses into four guiding principles: 1) the communal shapes us more than we 
shape ourselves. 2) The human basics are everywhere and always much the 
same.69 3) Despite these similarities, a combination of cultural and linguistic 
differences can make communication (therefore communication of these basics as 
well) almost, though not entirely, impossible. 4) Most importantly, book-sustained 
continuities of community creating thought and practice can survive thousands of 
years of political, social, economic and even linguistic upheaval.70  
Noteworthy of these deeply instilled convictions, as Lindbeck himself refers 
to them, is that none of them relate directly to China, even though he refers to 
them as China-implanted modes of thought. What were at one point subliminal 
                                                
68 Lindbeck 2006, 28. With respect to Lindbeck’s Christian identity, he says a Lutheran pastor who 
was very communicative about real presence had a profound impact on him. Lindbeck 1990, 494. 
69 See ND for correlate. ND 60. 
70 Lindbeck 2006, 28. Lindbeck understands text in itself as initially including not only written 
text, but also orally transmitted tradition, ritual enactment and pictorial representations. These 
forms of text are different from speech acts in that they are fixed communicative patterns which 
are used in various contexts for many purposes and their meanings vary accordingly. In other 
words they indicate the framework within which individual speech acts are possible or meaningful. 
The notion that they are fixed communicative patterns is what gives text in its written form a 
comprehensiveness, complexity and stability which is unattainable in any other medium. Lindbeck 
1986, 361-362. 
 24 
observations made within the influence of Chinese culture, have over time 
translated into conscious sociological generalisations concerning the significance 
of culture and language with respect to communal interaction and the life of 
communities. He does not claim certainty in the significance of these childhood 
observations, nor does he elaborate on later events in his life like moving to 
America which might have further enhanced these subliminal convictions, but he 
considers these convictions as the root cause of his attraction to the sociological, 
philosophical and anthropological streams of thought which provided the central 
ideas for his cultural-linguistic perspective on religion.71 It implies that he does 
not regard his personal experiences as in any way foundational to the above 
attraction, but in his case, his own life experience assisted in manifesting these 
inclinations.  In other words he perceives his personal experience as having 
enhanced existing tendencies in his thought. It furthermore implies that he deems 
this inclination is in general more valid than other possible tendencies, which is 
most explicitly manifests itself in his advocating for the superiority of the cultural 
linguistic alternative he presents in the ND.72 The tendency to realise that the 
basic processes of linguistic, social and cognitive construction of reality and 
experience are much the same irrespective of place or time implies the general 
notion that we are as humans communal by nature. However the communal skills 
acquired via these basic processes can vary in their cultural-linguistic diversity to 
the extent that communicating, for example our understandings of this communal 
nature can become almost impossible. It demonstrates our dependency on the 
tools with which we understand how we exist as communal creatures. The 
dependency can be particularly “bewitching” if one assumes as unique the 
paradigm one gives authoritative status in one’s thinking, which Lindbeck 
regularly stresses73 is the case of those who hold modernity unique in its 
legitimacy and validity.74 From a CL perspective, assuming the uniqueness of the 
modern era does not make sense, even though its assumed uniqueness is a logical 
conclusion of its premisses.75 In short, modernity in the way Lindbeck asserts its 
nature is not a sensible option for him even though it is understandable option.   
                                                
71 Lindbeck 2006, 28. 
72 Even though he presents the cultural-linguistic theory as an alternative, the all-encompassing 
regulative view of doctrine, which in  is a derivative of his cultural linguistic theory, is understood 
to be superior (atleast in specifying what is normative about docrines ND p104-108)   
73 See ND, 22, 51, 77, 127, 130. 
74 Lindbeck 1990, 493. 
75 ND 20-21. 
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Marshall summarises Lindbeck’s lifelong thinking on the whole as being an 
extended reflection and attempt at answering how should the Christian community 
understand its identity and purpose in the modern world. According to Marshall, 
Lindbeck evaluates this question in the light of three central criteria: the church’s 
own past, its likely future and the scandal of Christian division. This correlates 
with Vainio’s more general assessment of Lindbeck on the basis of the ND. After 
a brief analysis of the most problematic points of Lindbeck’s CL proposal on the 
basis of the theological debate and discussion it has invoked during the last 25 
years, Vainio finds that the central problem from which all others emerge is 
Lindbeck’s understanding of the relation between text and the world.76 The 
relation between the text and the world correlates with that of the Christian 
community and the modern world because the text in the form of holy writ 
embodies in Lindbeck’s thinking the cultural linguistic reality, which constitutes 
the sense of the faithful of the Christian community in the scripture. Therefore it 
also constitutes the Christian community cultural-linguistically constituted by 
scripture in modern world by supplying the interpretive framework for seeking its 
coming into being.77 From this perspective, the ND can be seen to reflect the 
theological concerns of Lindbeck rather holistically since it has been successful in 
arousing discussion in precisely the area, which Marshall sees as of primary 
concern to Lindbeck during the most significant part of his career. In other words, 
Lindbeck managed to make his concerns the concern of theology to the extent that 
he, in alignment with Vainio’s conclusions, “put theology on a new track”.78 
Työrinoja puts Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic account of religious language 
and doctrine into perspective by analysing it through philosophy of language. 
Conventionally, language is examined in the light of three criteria. The first is 
syntax, which refers to the logical grammar of a statement: its vocabulary and the 
grammatical rules governing the correct intralinguistic application with respect to 
being meaningful within the language in question. The second is semantic, which 
is concerned with how an expression relates to the reality external to the language 
within which it has been articulated. It is concerned with what an expression is 
referring to and how the language itself conditions this referring and how this 
                                                
76 Marshall 2009, x; Vainio 2010, 73-75. 
77 ND, 116-117.  The sense of the faithful, ‘sensus fidelium’, is the cultural linguistic authority 
underlying the authority of the church which guided the formation of the canon. After the closing 
of the canon, the canon is what informs and therefore shapes the sense of the faithful of a Christian 
community which believes in the eschatological decisiveness of Jesus Christ. Lindbeck 2002, 205.   
78 Vainio 2010, 76. 
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affects our understanding of reality. The third is pragmatic, which is concerned 
with the use and contexts of use of a language. Työrinoja notes that there is no 
consensus within philosophy of language as to how these three criteria relate to 
each other, but nonetheless how these three criteria are understood to relate to 
each other can reveal one’s position precisely in this respect.79 
In the light of these criteria, Työrinoja draws the conclusion that Lindbeck’s 
account is almost completely syntactic and pragmatic: religion is first and 
foremost a question of knowing how to be religious in a given tradition. The 
semantic criteria are lacking almost completely rendering the model toothless in 
examining questions surrounding truth and meaning. Those are understood to 
belong solely to first order discourse, and therefore become questions inherent 
only to the performative use of religious language in the context of first order 
discourse.80 
The structurally inbuilt lack of semantic criteria can also be viewed as 
intentional on Lindbeck’s part in the sense that it lacks semantic criteria precisely 
for the purpose that it is those criteria which have to be rethought in order to move 
towards establishing a more viable understanding of the semantics concerning 
Christian language. It brackets out the questions concerning the ontological or 
correspondent truth of dogmas with the specific neutrality brought about by the 
lack of semantic criteria, which Lindbeck considers as the decisive advantage of 
his model for ecumenical dialogue.81 Lindbeck wants to challenge the theological 
community in this respect instead of explicitly putting forward his own 
understanding of this, which according to Juntunen can to an extent be seen as 
existing implicitly in the ND.82 Hunsinger cites Lindbeck’s last sentence in the 
ND: “May their tribe increase” in his assessment of postliberal theology. 
According to Hunsinger, that tribe can be recognized by a common set of goals, 
like moving beyond the liberal/evangelical impasse by way of rethinking old 
questions like the truth of theological language which has been facilitated by the 
rise of nonfoundationalism. The ND in this respect can be seen as methodological 
support and guidance for channelling this tribe’s desires,83 which comes close to 
Vainio’s talk of Lindbeck putting theology on a new track as mentioned earlier. It 
                                                
79 Työrinoja 1991, 203. 
80 Työrinoja 1991, 203-205. 
81 Hutter 1997, 45. 
82 Juntunen 2004, 214. 
83 Hunsinger 2003, 57. 
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seems Lindbeck’s intent was to enhance certain existing tendencies within the 
emerging contemporary context. 
Postliberal theology is a manifestation of narrative theology, which came 
out of America in the 1970’s. It was a reaction to the dominant tendencies, which 
tried to extract the real meaning from the narrative and present it in univocal form 
in the form of unambiguous propositions. Narrative theology in contrast 
advocated for the irreducibility and irreplaceability of the narrative. Narratives 
were in themselves to be understood as the primary language of the scriptures. 
Accordingly systematic theology done on the basis of a narrative must continually 
circle ‘back home’ to the narrative in order to be judged and kept in check.84 The 
narrative was in this way appointed the role of leading preunderstanding in the 
hermeneutical circle. 
According to Juntunen, an important work concerning narrative theology is 
Hans Frei’s “Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative”. Frei’s intention is to demonstrate 
that the basic problem in modern theology is that it has not taken the narrative of 
the Christ in the gospel as the starting point of doing theology. Modernity has 
attempted to make believing possible by discerning the relevance of Christ by 
historically critical methods or by pondering to which existential need Christ is 
the answer. In other words the human subject has been granted primacy. 
Therefore a corrective shift was needed. The corrective from Frei comes in the 
form of recovering the importance of scriptural narrative for theology. According 
to Fodor, it is amongst Frei’s most central contributions to PL theology in that it 
has significant Christological implications. If one takes seriously the reality 
constituting power of the text, then the narrative depiction of Christ leads to a 
certain priority of identity over presence. How God renders Christ to humanity is 
the hermeneutical key for understanding his presence. In other words God renders 
his presence, which implies his presence is in effect a rendering presence. It 
enables Christians to ascertain what Jesus Christ’s presence “in” the church and 
“in” the world means. 85  
Juntunen describes the basic idea of narrative theology as that of giving 
primacy to the world of the text. The given primacy serves in letting the otherness 
of the text remain as otherness by making the world of the bible the primary frame 
of reference for determining the meaning of the text. In order to understand the 
                                                
84 Stiver 1996, 134. Juntunen 2004, 207. 
85 Juntunen 2004, 203, 206-207. Fodor 2005, 234-235. This principle is expressed in Lindbeck’s 
understanding of witnessing, which entails being for the other. 
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world of the bible on its own terms, one must make out its plot, in other words, its 
narrative. The storyline of the bible then becomes the intrinsic point of reference 
for deriving meaning in the textual world. In brief, the meaning of the text is 
derived from within the text. However, the world of the text should not be overly 
emphasized i.e. text absorbs the world, since it can alienate one from reality. This 
is not only because the world of the text can become the only world one knows, 
but because in doing so one might overlook the extratextual references the world 
of the text itself assumes within itself. Juntunen understands the biblical world’s 
basic relation to reality as being that of an eye-opener: it makes it possible to view 
creation from a new perspective. Absorbing ‘reality’ into the reality of the bible 
might overlook that the world of the bible is precisely the created world in which 
we live.86  
According to Fodor, the sufficiency of narrative theology is limited. 
Narrative theology deepens the meaning of the text by expounding dimensions of 
its cognitive structures, which cannot be attained in any other way. However this 
does not render the narrative approach sufficient for all the needs of the church 
which requires a level of precision and systematisation that cannot be attained 
solely through narrative efforts. Fodor emphasises postliberals should do more to 
sustain the tension between systematic and narrative theological discourse. Fodor 
locates the crux of this challenge in the question of how the strange new world of 
the bible relates to other worlds. The ‘how’ involves determining how the biblical 
world impacts the extratextual? Does it replace it? Does it transform it? Does 
encountering the extratextual intratextually possibly advance a mutual process of 
judgement and correction? 87  
Vanhoozer points out that the bible contains more than narrative. It contains 
truth claims about God and God’s relationship to the world, which provide “inner-
biblical direction” for interpreting the narratives.88 These statements are as such 
irreducible to narrative form, even though narratives have the capacity to affirm 
the same content. Vanhoozer cites critics who assert that unfolding the world of 
the Bible narratively does not yet entail engagement with the world. Vanhoozer 
                                                
86 Juntunen 2010, 210-211, 213, 233-234. 
87 Fodor 2005, 238.  The questions concerning the relationship between the biblical world and the 
outside world here resembles the layout of Paul Knitter’s model which categorises different 
assumptions concerning the relationship between Christianity and other religions.   
88 Vanhoozer’s own theory of doctrine is directive. Vanhoozer 2005, xiii, 30. In other words, 
doctrines, which link together gospel and theology, are perceived as directives in contrast to 
Lindbeck who sees them as rules which regulate the the link between theology and the gospel. 
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further aligns himself with critic, that the narrative is dependent on the intratextual 
world of the text to the extent, that it disables it from being able to make any 
extratextual truth claims. The inability runs the danger of feeding Gnostic 
temptations by treating biblical narrative as knowledge enclosed in the intratextual 
world by subsequently overlooking the Church’s narrative in the world. It 
resonates with Vanhoozer’s understanding of where Lindbeck’s goes wrong with 
respect to revelation, which is that Lindbeck treats biblical texts as only human 
testimony, which according to Vanhoozer disables the bible from speaking in a 
way that transcends the world. Therefore, if Lindbeck’s intention was to distance 
his own position from the experiental-expressivist positions of Schleiermacher, 
Lindbeck ends up himself articulating a form of corporate expressivism.89 
Lindbeck’s position in theological schools of thought is most firmly within that of 
postliberal theology, which is also referred to as the Yale school of narrative 
theology, even though this type of categorization is not without its problems. The 
Nature of Doctrine (ND) can be considered one of the seminal works with respect 
to the formation of what has become known as postliberal theology. Alister 
McGrath has considered ND as the most significant statement of the postliberal 
agenda. It is the most widely read and cited account of postliberal theology. 
Tuomo Mannermaa considers ND alongside Reinhard Hütter’s “Suffering Divine 
Things” as the most significant systematic investigation into the churches’ 
understanding of doctrine.  
The ND has had direct bearing on significant theological efforts.90 Paul 
Knitter credits Lindbeck as one of the first theologians to hear the message of 
postmodernism and convey it to theology. Fodor 
 notes however, that it is misleading and unwarranted to consider ND as 
some type of manifesto of postliberal theology, because it was intended to serve 
as a preliminary discussion towards a theologically substantial study in 
comparative dogmatics.  
Fodor sees it more essentially as a programmatic proposal that concerns 
itself with methodological issues, which are in their general character 
                                                
89 Vanhoozer 2005, 94-95, 95n66, 95n68, 97, 99-100. See also Vainio 2010, 74. 
90 For example, Vanhoozer refers to his post-conservative, canonical-linguistic theology and 
directive theory of doctrine as a cousin of Lindbeck’s postliberal, cultural-linguistic and regulative 
theory of doctrine. The structural outlines of his work speak for themselves. Vanhoozer 2005, xiii. 
For a comparison of these ‘cousins’, see Nummela 2010. McGrath regards Lindbeck’s 
shortcomings in understanding  the intellectual viability of cognitive propositional approaches to 
doctrine as a factor which led him to develop his three volume project: “A Scientific Theology”. 
McGrath 2002, 41-42. 
 30 
pretheological.91 In this sense the ND is a pretheological preview of the 
theological tasks ahead in that it enables theology to distance itself from itself in 
order to enable new theological developments by way of expanding the 
‘conceptual envelope’92 within which the doing of theology takes place. 
Fodor’s perspective is echoed in DeHart’s analysis of an apparent irony 
present in the rise of Lindbeck’s ND to that of a manifesto within the postliberal 
project. It is telling of the general character and possible intent of the ND in that 
coinciding with its rise to manifesto status within the postliberal project was the 
almost complete disappearance of postliberalism as a topic of active discussion 
and debate. This could at first sight reflect the ultimate rejection of its central 
ideas but DeHart also points to the contrary. Rather, it is evident that it was more 
a case of successful integration of its central ideas into theological discourse. 
Lindbeck’s ideas, just as Frei’s, had dissolved into the broader tradition of 
creative thought that came about through being in contact with the postliberal 
project in its most explicit form. As a result, the ideas of Lindbeck and Frei, which 
have their specific home in postliberalism, live now in a wider tradition of thought 
than ever before even though these extended effects may no longer be accounted 
solely to postliberalism. This wide scope of influence correlates with Bruce 
Marshall’s assessment of the ND in that it has over time emerged as one of the 
most influential works of academic theology to appear in English during the last 
fifty years.93 Postliberalism, in its rise and decline served in this sense as a 
specific forum for channelling its central ideas to a wider audience and this 
happened by way of permeating its scope of influence to various degrees.94   
The susceptibility of certain theological circles to postliberalism was surely 
no accident. Just as postliberal theology came out of Yale on the western shores of 
the Atlantic, similar developments took place in Britain in the 1980’s as a reaction 
against the liberalism of the 1960’s and 1970’s. These developments displayed a 
                                                
91 McGrath 1994, 109, Fodor 2005, 231-232. Lindbeck 1984 This intended study of Lindbeck’s is 
yet to materialise. Lindbeck’s intention has evolved into that of an ecclesiological study, 
concerned with what he refers to as a church-as-Israel ecclesiology. Lindbeck 1990, 493. 
However, it has not taken the form of any systematic presentation yet. Lindbeck 2006, 35. See The 
Church in a Postliberal Age ed. James J Buckley  for a collection of articles dealing with the issue. 
Lindbeck 2002. For an extensive analysis of the central tenets of Lindbeck’s ecclesiology based on 
what he has already published concering it, See Hutter 2000, 66-68.  
92 “Expanding the conceptual envelope” is here borrowed from Geertz who used it in the context 
of describing the nature of a similar need in social anthropology. By this he means, that the way to 
move beyond the limits and constraints of how we are accustomed to thinking within for eg 
theology, comes about by placing these customs into “a broader context of contemporary thought 
than they, in and of themselves, encompass”. See Geertz 1973, 88-89. 
93 Marshall 2009, vii. 
94 DeHart 2006, 43. 
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vague resemblance to postliberalism by sharing in the postliberal mood. However, 
of specific significance is that these theologians, such as Rowan Williams, John 
Webster, Nicholas Lash, Andrew Louth, Oliver O’Donovan and Colin Gunton, 
formulated their positions greatly within their own contexts and largely 
independent of the influence of Frei and Lindbeck. By the 1990’s it had become 
pointless to attribute developments labelled postliberal to any single point of 
origin. Rather, it seems that it was a question of the time having been ripe for a 
certain type of reaction, one instantiation of which was the Yale postliberals, and 
another the British reaction.95 
The programmatic nature of ND correlates with the way postliberal 
theology itself has evolved since its inception, which has consequently affected 
how postliberal theology is perceived today. Fodor sees it as a movement within 
theology rather than a specific school of thought, which would be open to 
systematisation. Fodor’s realism in this respect is a derivative of what postliberal 
engagement usually entails in practice: it is a joint effort rather than an 
autonomous one when it comes to dealing with doctrinal issues. It is characterised 
by collaborative engagement rather than autonomous scholarship. Doing theology 
in this sense means it is in its very essence a corporate effort.96 This resonates 
with one central aim of postliberal theology, which Fodor articulates as being that 
of an ecumenically open renewal of the church. In this context, the word 
‘ecumenical’ distinctly connotes the corporate dimension of the church. This 
openness is also identifiable in Lindbeck’s realism, which according to Pecknold 
is not interested in closure but in remaining open to judgement. Lindbeck did not 
write the ND in order to render a complete account to questions surrounding 
meaning, or truth or justification. Rather he understands engaging communally 
with scripture as a journey into truth and this journey discloses an open ended 
propositional answer to these questions. This does not imply that there is no truth 
                                                
95 DeHart 2006, 44-45. Reijo Työrinoja’s article in TA/1985 titled “Is Wittgensteinian Theology 
possible” can in the light of the above be considered one indicator/reflection of the same type of 
awareness breaking through in the context of finnish theology roundabout the same time as ND. 
Even though Työrinoja takes his cue for his article from Yale professor Paul L Holmer, there are 
no other references to Yale postliberals in his article. Instead it is concerned with examining the 
possibilities of utilising Wittgenstein in theology which ofcourse indirectly goes to the heart of  the 
philosophical instruments analogously utilised in ND. For article,  See TA 3/1985,169-176. By 
1991 Lindbeck’s work had broken through into Finnish discourse. See Työrinoja “systematic 
theology and religious language”  which deals solely with the main tenets of ND . TA/1991. 
96 Lindbeck says concerning listening to Scripture as the final authority, that one must do so in the 
company of all those at all times and places who have taken the biblical story seriously. This 
emphasis on the corporate nature of listening to scripture emphasises the reality that if one does 
not listen to those who have listened, one is in fact not genuinely listening. ND 103. 
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beyond a ‘gigantic proposition’, but rather states that truth needs to perceived 
communally (and therefore is necessarily mediated by a semiotic system) and in 
this way correlates with the internal logic (communion) of the triune life of God. 
In this way Lindbeck’s semiotic attentiveness aims at relativizing relativism with 
the revelation of God as the ultimate reality97  
As a movement within theology, postliberal theology understands itself as a 
corrective in the early reformatory sense. It is not in the business of creating 
something new. Through ecumenically regenerative practices it aims at repairing 
and constructing theology from where theology is by raising a postliberal 
awareness. This awareness concerns itself with the dangers arising from regarding 
religious experiences as universal, but subsequently also with the inherent 
potential for false projections resulting from founding one’s religious self-
understanding on foundational propositions. This awareness associates itself with 
a desire and commitment to move beyond the liberal/evangelical impasse resultant 
of modernity.98 How this is to be achieved is partially a reason for why postliberal 
theology concerns itself with methodology. It is looking for a way out this 
persisting dichotomy. A central aspect of postliberalism is reclaiming the notion 
of community tradition as a controlling influence in theology, and it is this notion 
in particular which is inbuilt into the methodological outlook of postliberal 
theology.99 For this reason it is the significance of community which determines 
the understanding of community in postliberal theology, that which Lindbeck 
wants to say is substantially overlooked in conventional ways of perceiving the 
role of doctrines in communal discourse/identity. As a result, postliberals 
advocate a mediating third alternative or a third way.100 
                                                
97 Fodor 2005, 229, 230; Pecknold 2005, 101, 104. 
98 Hunsinger 2003, 57. 
99 Fodor 2005, 784. McGrath 1994, 501. 
100 In advocating for a third way in the context of theology, postliberalism could be seen as joining 
a loose category associated with mediating and reconciling differences in rather diverse contexts. 
For example, the third way in politics which tries to reconcile left and right wing policies, 
socialism and capitalism (advocated notably by sociologist Anthony Giddens), for a marginal 
example concerning culture, see‘third culture’ (aslo known as crossculture), which tries to bridge 
the gap between different worlds.  Pollock & Van Reken 2009. As a philosophical concept it was 
coined by the founder of pragmatism Charles Peirce who typically characterises thirdness as 
mediation. Saarinen sees thirdness as an emerging concept carrying on from recent discussions on 
otherness. Although Saarinen sees it as a concept still seeking an established meaning, he 
characterises it in one sense as a ‘mediation of sort’ born in encountering the other. Of particular 
interest to the theme of this study, is that Saarinen likens this thirdness to an offspring of 
hospitality, and by doing so links thirdness into old Christian tradition. Saarinen 2008, 31-32. 
Common to all of the above is that the thirdness implied assumes the new whole as something 
greater than the sum of its parts in that thirdness brings something new or strange (depending on 
how pragmatic one’s general approach is) into the equation. This links in with Lindbeck’s basic 
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Mannermaa sees Lindbeck’s CL model as a clear progression from the CP 
and EE models, which he profiles in the ND.  The proposed solution, whereby 
religious language is the a priori to religious experience, is especially welcome 
for ecumenical dialogue, because no historical religious community would 
welcome the claim that its language and system of symbols is a nondiscursive 
expression of a one and the same experience.101 This would disempower the 
language of its meaning, because meaning is dependent on the history that has 
disclosed it. 
McGrath assesses Lindbeck’s ND as a failed attempt in finding a way out of 
the failure of the enlightenment project. Evidence of this is that nothing 
significant has emerged from the Yale school, which would speak on the behalf of 
reaping the fruit of an initially promising approach outlined in the ND. This leads 
McGrath to conclude that Lindbeck’s explored approach is a dead end.102  
McGrath suggests that Lindbeck has misread the spirit of the times in 
thinking that cultured people do not take seriously the capability of language to 
refer to extra-systemic realities. This misreading is a result of not being up to date 
with the advance made by realist theories of knowledge. Mcgrath argues, that 
despite utilising social scientists such as Clifford Geertz, Lindbeck does not take 
into account what natural sciences have offered with respect to cognitive-
propositional approaches to reality.103 This McGrath sees as a possibly fatal flaw 
in Lindbeck’s thinking on the whole. In all, Lindbeck offers a disappointingly 
superficial account of the place of doctrine within the Christian community 
according to McGrath.104 It seems this is especially the case with Lindbeck’s 
portrayal of the cognitive-propositional approach. 
The basic problem with Lindbeck’s account of a cognitive-propositional 
understanding of doctrine is according to McGrath that it misunderstands that 
position to hold a belief that it is possible to state the objective truth about God 
“definitely, exhaustively and timelessly in propositional form.” Where it fails is 
                                                                                                                                 
rejection of two-dimensional theories of doctrine, for eg Rahner, Lonergan, even though they are 
from a CL point of view its closest competitors. Hybridity consists of two constitutive parts which 
condition the whole completely, rather than bringing into the equation something new which sheds 
new light on these constitutive parts. ND 17-18. 
101 Mannermaa 2000, 190. 
102 McGrath 2002, 52-53. 
103 These approaches in the scientific context carry with them a commitment to a belief in the 
reality the theoretical language depicts because it constitutes the meaning of that language. 
According to this view, what the language refers is basically an argument for that reality being 
’really out there’. For example a realist will argue that positrons are ’out there’. McGrath 1990, 21-
32. 
104 Mcgrath 2002, 46, 52; Macgrath 2003, 31. 
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that it does not take into account the historical and linguistic sophistication of 
these approaches to doctrine, and in doing so does not pay adequate attention to 
what it means to suggest that religious claims are cognitive.105 McGrath notes that 
for example in the medieval period dogma was mostly understood as a dynamic 
concept. In these propositional traditions doctrines are recognized as perceptions, 
not total descriptions, which point beyond themselves rather than represent truth 
as such concerning God. Doctrines were understood as perceptions of truth 
tending toward this truth.  McGrath quotes John Henry Newman as a 
manifestation of this more historically faithful portrayal of cognitive-
propositionalist approach concerning doctrine: “doctrines cannot hope to do what 
they express, but they are nevertheless necessary and proper means of preserving 
and communicating the mystery of faith. A proper understanding of this approach 
is therefore that it does not reduce an experience to works, but is simply an 
attempt to convey it through words. 106Many are critical of Lindbeck’s too 
straightforward account of the cognitive-propositional position.107 
Fodor assesses the future of postliberal theology as resting more on its 
ability to generate productive tensions, than on its ability to resolve theological 
problems. If success is judged on the basis of working resolutions rather than 
working solutions, postliberal theology will contribute significantly to the future 
of theology.108 If Fodor’s prognosis is correct, it implies postliberal theology is 
primarily to be perceived as an instrument, which provides constructive motives 
and incentives for doing theology. 
Vanhoozer places Lindbeck amongst those theologians who represent a turn 
to church practice, which is characteristic to contemporary theology. It leads to 
ecclesiology becoming the “first theology” which changes the hermeneutical 
                                                
105 McGrath 2002, 43-44. It is worth noting, that McGrath’s critic is not all points fair towards 
Lindbeck. Concerning his assessment of Lindbeck’s critique towards the cognitive-propositional 
perspective, McGrath suggests that Lindbeck suggests that those who are inclined to perceive 
religion in a cognitive fashion are those who combine unusual insecurity with naivete. Here 
McGrath takes Lindbecks heuristic intentions out of context. See ND, 21-22. It can be said in 
McGraths defense that Lindbeck does deal somewhat hastily with the cognitive propositional 
position. But McGrath is just as hasty towards Lindbecks limited heuristic intent in precisely this 
respect. 
106 McGrath 2002, 43-46. Despite being heavily critical of Lindbeck account of cognitive-
propositional theories of doctrine, McGrath sees Lindbeck’s critique of the experiental-expressive 
position, which sees doctrine referring to ubiquitous private prereflective experience underlying all 
religion, as fair and accurate and probably the most significant long-term contribution Lindbeck 
makes via the ND towards contemporary discussion concerning the nature of doctrine. McGrath 
1990, 20.  
107 See Vanhoozer 2005, 86-88; Juntunen 2004, 213-214, Volf 1996, 58-59, Wainwright 1988, 
122-123. Mannermaa 2000, 191-192. 
108 Fodor 2005, 246. 
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mindset. The question concerning the bible is no longer what kind of a text it is, 
but rather what kind of understanding is Christian understanding.109  
Marshall categorises criticism of the ND under three main reservations 
around which it tends to gather. The first is that epistemically the proposed 
theology amounts to a biblical or ecclesial fideism, which does not succeed in 
seeking rational justification for Christian beliefs in any sufficient way.  Secondly 
his theology is sectarian in nature, which leads the church to isolate itself from the 
world into a self-enclosed ghetto. Some have argued, that it does so to the point of 
irresponsibility. Thirdly, Lindbeck gives too much into postmodern relativism and 
therefore fails to account for the universality of truth especially with respect to 
doctrine.110  
Paul Knitter classifies theologies of religions into four categories111 
concerning the relationship between Christianity and other religions. He classifies 
Lindbeck under the acceptance model, which he sums as accepting a reality of 
many intrasystematically true religions and simply leaving it at that. His account 
of critique towards this model is interestingly fairly close to the critique usually 
levelled against Lindbeck according to Marshall. Knitter’s first point is 
isolationism, which implies that because religions are untranslatable, the language 
of the religion locks us into a world which makes encountering the religious other 
a linguistic impossibility. Truth as a result becomes completely intrasystematic 
and so the second critical charge is naturally that of relativism because truth is 
only expressible relative to one’s own traditions. It leads logically to the charge of 
fideism, because if truth is totally relative, any decision to believe in this truth is 
relative to the logic provided by the religion. In other words, if one’s approach to 
religion is intratextual in the sense depicted in this critique, the text ends up 
imprisoning one from the world by isolating one into a fideistic relativism which 
itself shuts all the exits. Hence any relation between the text and the world would 
cease to exist.112 As mentioned earlier, the critique is interrelated and tends to 
emerge from how the relation between the text and the world is perceived. It is 
also clear from the critique in that critique around Lindbeck has to do with how he 
                                                
109 Vanhoozer 2005, 175. 
110 Marshall 2009, xii-xiii. 
111 These categories are ”the replacement model”, “the fulfillment model”, “the mutuality model” 
and “the acceptance model”. See Knitter 2002. Karl Rahner’s notion of Anonymous Christian falls 
under the fulfillment model. Knitter 2002, 72-73. 
112 Knitter 2002, 224-226. 
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understands intratextuality. The next two chapters will attempt to show this 



























3. The cultural-linguistic perspective 
The aim of this chapter is to describe Lindbeck’s understanding of community on 
its own terms. His understanding of community is looked at in the context of a 
theory of religion which in its technical nature is designed to provide a communal 
perspective into why we think the way we think, i.e. to enable learning away from 
the immediacy which persists in our opinions in order to evaluate their 
relationship to the corporate reality in which they have been shaped and which 
continues to do so. It is interested in the relationship between the representer and 
what is actually being represented and how the latter regulates this relationship. 
Lindbeck’s general motive for writing the ND, as noted before, was in the 
frustration towards traditional ways of understanding how doctrine is understood 
to represent the religious identities of religious institutions. When different 
churches come to the table to engage in ecumenical dialogue, each party does so 
with a ‘working’113 solution. More clearly stated, each party joins these 
ecumenical dialogues with their identities intact in the sense that its doctrinal 
confessions are working solutions within the community where these doctrines 
have authoritative status.  
Engaging in dialogue is then essentially understood to be a practical 
responsibility, which originates from these working self-understandings as a result 
of the scandalous and practical reality that Christians are divided in their numbers 
and that these divisions are doctrinally enforced. In other words the responsibility 
to engage in attempts to overcome these divisions originate from what holds intact 
and constitutes the life of a religious community. What separates one from the 
other is simultaneously what obligates the removing of these fences. This 
constitutes perhaps the basic tension in understanding the nature of ecumenical 
dialogue and which Lindbeck seeks to put into perspective by conceptualising it, 
not removing it, with the concept of reconciliation without capitulation. 114 
In beginning to discern Lindbeck’s audience, Phillips makes a point 
concerning the difficulties, which challenge ecumenical aspirations in general at a 
very basic and influential level. He notes that the religious traditions in which we 
                                                
113 ND 8-10. Lindbeck demonstrates with a card experiment that theoretical frameworks condition 
its adherents in a way that makes their perception of problems and their possible solutions 
irrefutable in themselves. In other words they work, because they are designed to work. 
114 ND 15-19. Reconciliation without capitulation implies that historically opposed doctrinal 
positions can in some cases be reconciled while remaining in themselves unchanged. There are in 
other words different doctrinal formulations that can be identified in having identical theological 
intentions despite being articulated within different doctrinal paradigms and hence irreconcilable 
in that sense apart from confluences. 
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find ourselves, is most often accidental. In other words, belonging to a religious 
cultural-linguistic system is more often than not as accidental as being born: one 
does not make a choice, but rather a choice is made on one’s behalf. Only few 
have a true sense of the original theological reasons as to why divisions exist. 
Most are born into a reality of division and take it for granted and do not question 
the validity of these divisions. In ecumenical engagement this can reflect as 
progress being dictated by convenience rather than conviction, and economic 
pressures can weigh more than theological considerations. If one understands 
Phillips correctly, the more we become aware of how the church has arrived at its 
present situation and the less we take that for granted, the more room and motive 
there is for theological considerations in ecumenism.115 How  Lindbeck attempts 
to create more room for theological consideration is the question we turn to next. 
When someone asks a Finnish person a question in Finnish, the Finn 
responds in Finnish. Their communication is mediated by Finnish language. When 
life poses questions of ultimate importance, we respond religiously. According to 
Lindbeck, our ability to respond religiously to life can be generally understood as 
following one of two ways of going about it: the cognitive-propositional 
(preliberal) or the experiential-expressive (liberal).  
Cognitive-propositional theory understands religion as proposing cognition 
in the form of informative truth claims. This implies that one is able to respond 
religiously to life by way of engaging with/becoming engaged by religious 
knowledge that is taken to correspond with an objective reality. The authority for 
this perspective lays in the assumed referential link this knowledge, when in the 
form of doctrine and doctrinal truth claims, has with the state of affairs 
independent of our subjective perceptions of it. This is authorised in part by the 
capacity granted to language in referring to objective realities. In brief, it declares 
a state of reality as a result of asserting doctrinal truth claims and they are 
authoritative because they are understood to communicate the proper truth about 
God. For this same reason this perspective has, according to Lindbeck, difficulty 
in envisioning different doctrinal formulations of substantially identical truth 
claims.116  
Experiental-expressivist theory understands religion as expressing 
experience, which implies that responding religiously to life is essentially 
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introspective engagement with one’s experience of existence. Here doctrine plays 
a purely descriptive role and doctrinal authority is based in the subjective 
experience, which it articulates, not in the doctrine itself. This is authorised with 
the axiom that all humans share a universal core experience concerning existence. 
In other words, it locates a religious constant in the prereflective depths of inner 
experience. Doctrines are then accordingly understood to be noninformative and 
nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes or existential orientations, in 
other words derivatives of experience.117 
The cultural linguistic theory, and its inbuilt logic, is on Lindbeck’s part a 
response to the inadequacy felt towards these two conventionally established ways 
of understanding how we respond to life religiously. His response is motivated by 
a frustration towards the insufficiency of these dominant perspectives into how we 
perceive and understand the nature of doctrines and the communal reality they in 
turn depict. According to Lindbeck, these responses lead to an insufficient 
understanding of how communities are defined by these doctrines.118 Lindbeck’s 
alternative is in effect a resolution towards moving beyond two existing 
‘solutions’, which each in themselves project a certain account of reality. In order 
to gain a more adequate perspective into how doctrines function, the nature of the 
context where these doctrines are applied becomes Lindbeck’s concern. The 
communal reality, i.e. the context, conditions the way doctrines function in any 
case, and therefore Lindbeck construes a cultural-linguistic perspective of religion 
in order to better understand the nature of this reality. Accordingly, a theory of 
doctrine then needs to take into account this reality in a complimentary manner.119 
One could say Lindbeck wants to put the reality of our communal/corporate 
nature into how we understand doctrines as defining the identity of a community. 
This is attained by putting religion into a cultural-linguistic framework in 
order to articulate a perspective into how we understand ourselves to be how, 
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rather than whom we are with respect to religion. This brings about a cultural 
linguistic account of doctrine. This account is regulatory, because of the nature of 
religion (a medium in which one moves) expounded by the model is regulatory to 
its adherents, i.e. we participate in cultural linguistic schemes. As a result of 
religion being understood as a “comprehensive interpretive scheme which 
structures human experience and understanding of self and world”, questions 
concerning the nature of religion, nature of doctrine, and the nature of truth are 
interrelated. From the top down, it implies that an understanding of religion 
implies a certain understanding of the doctrine, which will also implicate how one 
is to relate to its claims concerning truth. From the bottom up, truth claims have 
an inbuilt understanding of doctrine (grammar), which have an inbuilt 
understanding of religion (language).  This interdependence constitutes an integral 
question brought forth by the cultural linguistic-perspective: how do we learn to 
be how we are?120  
The paradigmatic emphasis has a distinct theological motive in the 
paradigmatic distance it articulates to religion and the immediacy of life in 
religious communities. Its purpose is to provide an alternative perspective into 
religious self-understanding and how it comes about. One can for heuristic 
purposes view it as utilising sociological imagination121 in the context of 
theology. Anthony Giddens describes the requirement of this basic notion in 
sociology as one of thinking ourselves away from the immediacy of personal 
circumstances in order to understand them in the wider context with the intention 
of viewing our place and ourselves in it anew.122  It challenges to view our own 
realities as derivatives of the realities in which we dwell, rather that perceiving 
our homes as extensions of ourselves. Our home, understood as the cultural-
linguistic medium in which exist, determines one’s reality to a significant and 
meaningful extent, and becoming aware of this is important. For example, modern 
society is not as much an extension of the modern individual, but rather the 
modern individual is a manifestation of modern society. 
A cultural-linguistic perspective on religion emerges when the logic of 
cultural linguistic systems is analogously applied to religion in order to 
conceptualise religion in a way, which can focus on religion as a fundamentally 
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communal reality.  In this communal respect, it functions similarly to culture 
and/or language in that it shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than the 
other way around. In contrast to the experiential expressive response, it inverts the 
relation of the internal and external dimensions of religion. The external 
determines the internal, which implies a religious reality is first and foremost a 
communal reality. Religion in this communal sense is not to be understood as a 
manifestation of the subjectivities it consists of, but rather a communally 
transmitted way of understanding oneself. Reality is as a result depicted as 
intersubjective, not subjective, and the model will maintain that this depiction is 
more valid, and hence more truthful, in terms of actually describing the nature of 
our religious existence.123 
Lindbeck understands religion as above all an external word, a verbum 
externum that moulds and shapes the self and its world, rather than an expression 
or thematization of a pre-existing self or preconceptual experience. The main 
function of a religion is to inform. For example in the case of Christianity, it is to 
inform the world of salvation in Christ. A religious community in this sense is 
where a particular and distinct external word has determining and constitutive 
influence amongst its members. More essentially, it is the space where the 
communication of the particular external word occurs. Because of this, 
communication involves the whole cultural linguistic system via which 
communication of a particular external word is possible. Religion is understood as 
a holistic medium, which encompasses the totality of communicative acts.124 
From a semiotic perspective the life of a religion can basically be equated with a 
religious community. 
The medium is comprised of a vocabulary and grammar/logic, which makes 
possible the meaningful deployment of its vocabulary. Lindbeck compresses the 
technical dimension of religion in this perspective as a “cultural and/or linguistic 
framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought.” It again 
represents the central emphasis of the cultural-linguistic outlook on religion: we 
are recipients of our religious identities. That we are recipients of our religious 
identities implies that it is precisely the religion, which enables one to have or 
experience certain perspectives, sentiments, thoughts, and realities. These are 
dependent on the religion and are shaped, moulded and in this sense constituted 
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by the religion in question. In this sense the cultural linguistic perspective 
correlates with the cognitive propositional perspective, in that external beliefs are 
primary, but the comprehensive scheme used to structure religious identity is not a 
set of propositions to be believed, but rather a medium in which one moves in 
living one’s life. Religion can in this sense be understood as similar to an idiom, 
in that it enables a holistic perspective towards life because the context rendering 
the message meaningful coheres with the intended message in that they are 
mutually constitutive.125  
It is important to note, that this reversing of the order between the outer and 
inner in terms of determining significance does not imply that the relationship 
between a community and its dwellers is in some sense not mutual. For example, 
mutuality is the precondition for any possible transformation within a particular 
community, but this transformation in itself is primarily a result of the cultural-
linguistic system as a whole interacting with changing situations within the course 
of history because all individual action is communally defined and conditioned 
and in this sense theory laden. Lindbeck writes: 
 
“..religious change or innovation must be understood, not as preceding from new 
experiences, but as resulting from the interactions of a cultural-linguistic system 
with changing situations. Religious are not transformed, abandoned, or replaced 
because of an updwelling of new or different ways of feeling about the self, world, 
or God, but because a religious interpretive scheme (embodied, as it always is, in 
religious practise and belief) develops anomalies in its application in new contexts. 
This produces, among other things, negative effects, and negative experiences, even 
by the religion’s own norms. Prophetic figures apprehend, often with dramatic 
vividness, how the inherited patterns of belief, practice and ritual need to be (and 
can be) reminted. They discover the concepts that remove anomalies. Religious 
experiences in the sense of feelings, sentiments, or emotions then result from the 
new conceptual patterns instead of being their source.”126 
 
 The above way of viewing the mutuality in question tries to account for the 
taken-for-granted aspects of the situational realities in which we dwell by viewing 
who we are inseparably through our communal contexts. Lindbeck makes this 
distinction explicitly when he says: “..it is the framework and the medium within 
which Christians know and experience, rather than what they experience or think 
they know, that retains continuity and unity down through the centuries.” The 
intention is to focus on what is cultural.linguistically determinant in a given 
religious community.  Lindbeck sees this as being possible only if we view 
religious experiences as resulting from conceptual patterns inbuilt in cultural-
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linguistic systems, rather than experiences being the source of these conceptual 
patterns.127 This is clearly expressed in Lindbeck’s interpretation of how Luther 
arrived at his doctrine of justification by faith through an exegetical insight: 
“Luther did not invent his doctrine of justification by faith because he had a tower 
experience, but rather the tower experience was made possible by his discovering 
(or thinking that he discovered) the doctrine in the bible.”128  Religion from the 
cultural linguistic perspective is a question of linguistic competence: the capacity, 
ability and capability to use Christian language, which exists within the text. 
Religion is in this sense a medium and framework of competence. 
From Lindbeck’s cultural linguistic point of view one can then say that a 
Christian is someone who has some ability to speak the language of Christianity. 
It is of vital importance to note that when using this analogy, Lindbeck means it in 
a very humble sense.  
 
“all human beings are toddlers, whether Peter, Paul of the veriest infant in Christ. 
The decisive question regarding them is whether the language they have begun to 
learn ex audito is that of Jesus Christ, that of true humanity, or something else. Is, 
for example, the love about which they feebly stutter, and which they are just 
beginning to understand and hope for, defined by Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection, 
or in some other way.. .. Only occasionally do they have inklings of the words they 
utter.. ..every aspect of the new life exists in the modality of hope..[and so] ..pride in 
being a Christian is excluded. Believers have by grace just begun to learn of the one 
in whom alone is salvation, but in moral and religious quality they are like other 
human beings”129 
 
 Lindbeck also uses language as an analogy for understanding the difference 
between theology and religious faith. Learning theology is not to be understood in 
correlation with learning to speak a language of faith, but instead with studying 
the grammar and dictionary definitions of the verbal and nonverbal (ritual, moral 
and basically anything that constitutes a distinctive form of behaviour) items in its 
vocabulary. Therefore theology aims at gaining an understanding of a religion. 
With respect to doctrines, this implies doctrines are also second order discourse 
about first order discourse (speaking), because doctrines seek to explicate the 
inner logic of the faith which is spoken. In other words, a Christian can be a 
competent speaker of the language of Christ, insofar as the Christian speaks of 
Christ, without understanding the grammar of doctrinal formulations. One is able 
to speak a language when one knows how to use the right words correctly in order 
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to express one’s faith. This type of knowing is independent of the knowledge that 
there is a grammar to the language, which defines the logic of and therefore 
intrinsically regulates the correct application of words. Rather, it is knowledge 
that has been learned (absorbed) subliminally as a result of belonging to a 
cultural-linguistic environment, which has as an inbuilt property the grammar of 
the religion. Competence is a communally acquired communal skill. Lindbeck 
borrows an example to make his point: “the master of Greek that was Homer had 
unsurpassed “how” knowledge of the grammar of his mother tongue but no 
“what” or “that” knowledge whatsoever.” In other words Homer knew how to use 
Greek unsurpassably well. He did not know the rules that determine this use. His 
knowing was informal.130 The same logic goes for a computer literate 10 year old. 
He/she can be very literate in understanding how to use a computer without any 
knowledge of how the computer technically works. The technical logic 
concerning how the hardware and software together with electricity render a 
usable application remains completely in the shadows. What needs to be 
understood in order to be computer literate is how different applications work, not 
what renders the application workable in terms of how it was programmed and 
how this relates to the physics involved. A religious community is, if thought of 
analogously to a computer, a hermeneutic in itself. 
In order to stress the significance of the distinction Lindbeck wishes to 
make with his language analogy, he writes: “to confuse learning theology with 
learning to speak and act in the language of faith can erase the difference between 
death and life.”131 The main emphasis here is that being a religious person, and 
even if someone were to be the most competent speaker on the behalf of some 
religion, has necessarily nothing to do with understanding that religion as a 
cultural linguistic system, i.e. understanding the understanding of the religion. 
Rather the understanding inbuilt in the cultural linguistic system is the 
competence of the competent speaker, i.e. the cultural linguistic system lives in 
the mind of the speaker. It understands on behalf of the one living out this 
understanding.  In this sense the authority of competence is in the interpreting 
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community.132 But the ultimate understanding of this authority is intrinsic to the 
cultural linguistic system to which the community is seeking correspondence to 
when utilising the bible as a cultural-linguistic deposit, or in Lindbeck’s words as 
a “relatively fixed canon of writings that [the religious community] treats as a 
normative instantiation of their semiotic code.” That is why testing the 
truthfulness /faithfulness of a communities interpretation is a case of assessing the 
“degree to which these interpretations correspond to the semiotic universe 
encoded in holy writ”.133 In this sense the ultimate authority is with scripture, and 
the communities interpretation of paradigmatically encoded holy writ is a 
proposition. Hence it might do more justice to Lindbeck to understand it as 
propositional authority on the behalf of the community or as a corporate praxis of 
authority, not ultimate authority.  
The grammar of language is accounting for the internal meaning of 
language. Christianity as a language implies its grammar is an account of its 
internal meaning. Meaning has everything to do with truth when it comes to 
religion, especially Christianity. Therefore the account of truth correlates directly 
with the account of meaning. A grammar of a religion, when understood 
analogously with language, is therefore a systematic account of the inner logic of 
a cultural linguistic system and how this relates to conventional reality and the 
confessed reality. This relationship is of great importance because it is what ties 
meaningful language to reality. Grammar alone is pointless if one is unaware of 
the subject matter to which the grammar is paying reference.134  In order to 
account for this relationship from a cultural-linguistic perspective Lindbeck 
analyses truth to serve the needs of the model.  
Lindbeck’s understanding of truth consists of three distinct dimensions: 
categorical, intrasystematic and ontological. How these three dimensions of truth 
relate to each other entail a grammar of truth. The first two perspectives tackle 
how truth constructs itself, i.e. what conditions the coherent nature of truth and in 
this sense have nothing directly to do with truth. They ask ‘what is Christian?’ 
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The ontological aspect deals with how this construction can be understood as 
corresponding with truth and asks ‘is Christianity true?’. 135 
Categorical truth concerns itself with the sufficiency and adequacy of 
meaning and reference. If something is categorically true, it is so because it is 
applicable to what is taken as real. For e.g., ‘God exists’ or ‘God is’ would qualify 
as categorical truth for theology because without this assumption theological 
thinking would render itself pointless as well as meaningless, i.e. without 
necessary reference with respect to trancendent meaningfulness. In other words 
categorical truths make possible, in accordance with the above example, the 
practice of theology, but it does not yet on its own guarantee a meaningful 
existence for it when being practiced.136 
Intrasystemic truth concerns itself with the coherence of the whole within 
which categorical truths are articulated. It is what verifies or justifies that which 
has been taken as categorical. In other words it provides the relevance categorical 
statements have with the total way of thought and life in a given cultural-linguistic 
system. Thus religious statements are only valid when they concur with the total 
manner of speaking and the whole network of Christian beliefs and practices. If 
categorical truths are to be understood as necessary hermeneutical references 
towards an understanding, which they of course for meaningful understanding, the 
intrasystemic dimension of truth is the hermeneutical lens, which brings the 
categorical points of reference into accurate focus with respect to meaning. It 
either verifies, adjusts or falsifies the categorical meaning.137  
Ontological truth is something that has to be qualified by being 
intrasystemically and categorically true to begin with. A mutual coherence 
between these criteria needs to exist. However, its ontological validity is 
ultimately verifiable only according to the fruit it bears through its performative-
propositional appropriation.  In other words there is no direct possibility of 
judging whether a truth claim or the religion within which it is articulated is true 
of false.138 It either gains or does not gain propositional force in as far as its use 
corresponds with the ontological dimension of reality. As far as assessing the 
faithfulness of the correspondence (the fruit), what Jesus said and what he did is 
of ultimate ontological significance in terms of truth, which theologically remains 
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an ultimate ontological mystery.139 This is something most clearly expressed in 
Lindbeck’s prospective theory of salvation which will be exemplified in chapter 4.  
However, this mystery is ontologically embodied in Christ and therefore 
verifiable from the fruit of a community that seeks to witness Christ.140 
Assertions concerning ontological truth can according to Lindbeck only be 
made when speaking religiously. Speaking is understood as a deed through which 
one seeks correspondence to what one is speaking of. Only in the immediate 
realm of religious speech, i.e. where speech is intended to be religiously 
meaningful in the first order sense is one able to assert ontological truths. In 
alignment with Austin’s notion of performatory use of language, religious speech 
accesses for oneself the propositional truth of ontological correspondence by 
helping to create the correspondence. Performative speech in this sense engages 
with the proposed truth in order to bridge the gap to the reality the truth 
corresponds with. Speaking functions in this way as a way of constituting one’s 
religious identity in order to align oneself and others with what is taken as, and 
therefore spoken of, as the most important. When Christians speak of Christ, they 
speak the Christian language only so far as they manage to confess Christ in their 
speech.141 
From a purely subjective perspective, truth is a question of what one feels is 
of ultimate importance in contrast to knowing objectively what is most important. 
For example, a person can be heard saying in an age saturated by entertainment, 
that “I believe in entertainment.”142 It makes sense only when the person is 
understood to be saying that one believes in the power of entertainment. Whether 
such a statement is sensible in any substantial way concerning the meaning of life 
for someone, is inherently an irrelevant question because it does not affirm 
anything particular about life beyond entertainment. It simply affirms that 
entertainment is experienced as meaningful to the extent that it is of ultimate 
significance to someone. An inbuilt indifference can be seen present as a 
meaningful meaninglessness. Evident of such indifference is evident for example 
in the success of the slogan: “The truth is out there”, which resonated successfully 
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within the reality of entertainment during the 1990’s. The notion of external truth 
explicitly expressed in the slogan, which in the TV series X-Files concerns itself 
with that of  extra-terrestrial life, seems to have provided the imaginations of 
numerous TV viewers with the required food for thought. However, when it 
comes to searching for substantially meaningful truth in our time, it seems a lot 
easier to assume the depths of the inner-self as legitimate sources.143 Furthermore 
for the sake of illustrating the logic of this imagination, this ironically bears 
similarity with another slogan coined by the TV-series in question: “trust no-one”, 
which implies placing trust in none other but yourself is understood as dangerous. 
Lindbeck sees members of western societies as increasingly regarding all 
religions as sources of symbols to be utilised in articulating, clarifying and 
organizing experiences of the inner-self.144 This increasing reliance on the self is 
seen as originating from within the structures of modernity145, and the consequent 
pressure it places on people living under its influence. However, the pressure in 
question is not something that is perceived as external or identified to be of social 
origin which would imply it has been communicated to the recipient in the form 
of tradition, but rather it is enforced by the individual by embracing the values of 
modernity subliminally. In other words members of modern societies hold 
themselves accountable in regarding experiences of the inner-self as the basic 
criteria in one’s individual quest for personal meaning. This implies from the 
cultural-linguistic perspective that it is not by choice, but by lack of choice 
resultant of the regulative authority given to modernity in the paradigmatic sense. 
It pushes upon us the need to make choices and the choices we make are 
understood as valid because they are understood as being independent and thus 
meaningful. Anything that falls short of this assumption is according to Lindbeck, 
“an infringement of freedom and choice, a denial of creativity, and repugnant to 
all the most cherished values of modernity”.146 
The contradictory nature of modernity is clear in this respect: the lack of 
paradigmatic choice has brought about unlimited significance to personal choice 
in the religious respect. Truth becomes a case of choice rather than that of 
perception. Lindbeck’s assessment is that modernity is ingrained in the soul of the 
West to the degree that it has induced a blind spot in dealing with religious 
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matters. What is taken as categorically valid in the paradigmatic sense hides the 
incoherencies that arise as a result of its inherent and thus often subliminal 
convictions. To illustrate, the coherency of an experience based religious identity 
is only coherent as long as it understands one’s subjective experience as 
constitutive to religious identity. One hears the experience, but not the paradigm 
justifying and thus constituting this listening to one’s inner self. If one claims that 
religious truth is a private and individual matter, one is able to say so because one 
is not aware that this conviction is actually not of private origin, but rather an 
inherent consequence of the ‘turn to the subject’ that modernity instils 
paradigmatically in it adherents. More critically stated, a modern individual grants 
revelatory status to modernity subliminally.147 The individualist traits in 
modernism are communally transmitted even when they are on average thought of 
as of primarily intrinsic heritage on the part of the individual.148 Lindbeck takes 
the roots of this dilemma further in declaring it is conceptually confused to talk of 
symbolizations or experiences, which are purely private in the first place.149 In 
other words, there can be no individualistic (private) individualism, only 
communal (public) individualism, at least when we give relevance to the origins 
of our thought. This is an important reason as to why a cultural-linguistic 
perspective into our religious existence can be useful: it shows that our reality is 
communally constituted at a very basic level; a level, which Lindbeck is claiming, 
is largely and practically neglected by modernity.  
It can therefore be argued that individualism is from this perspective 
modernity’s sense of community despite the centripetal forces, which are inbuilt, 
in that people can conceive themselves as being individually together. But in this 
sense, a community in itself as a concept has a neutral stance towards building up 
or breaking apart the togetherness aspect of community, and implies nothing 
conclusive about the togetherness aspect of community usually associated with a 
sense of community. Instead what makes a community a community in this 
perspective is that it functions like a cultural linguistic system. This hopefully 
highlights the technical nature, and general plausibility of this perspective into the 
realities in which people dwell advocated by Lindbeck. A community in this 
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technical sense is not necessarily pro-community anymore than it is contra-
community. All that can maybe be said conclusively is that a community is. It is 
constantly in a state of life, so what regulates the life of this community (guides its 
substance) is the key question. Therefore it becomes logical to account for what 
determines the identity of a religious community through communally 
authoritative rules of discourse, attitude and action rendering the nature of 
doctrine regulative. They serve in constituting the cultural-linguistic identity of a 
community which is already cultural linguistic by nature.150 
 Christian communal reality and existence bears distinctive features in its 
externally derived nature when drawing biblical references. Ontological accounts 
of truth in the Bible are fundamentally out of the reach of articulation from 
anyone but God Himself, which is of categorical, intrasystemic and ontological 
significance to the very nature of Christianity. For example in Jesus’ words: “I 
am.. ..the truth” (John 14:6)151, truth is something in Christ and something Christ 
is. Therefore complete truth can only be known in and through Christ. Truth is in 
the same respect as truth is in: “God said to Moses ‘I AM WHO I AM’.”( 
Exodus3:14). The point of reference when articulating meaning to truth is in who 
says it. Exodus 3:14 continues with “This is what you are to say to the Israelites: 'I 
AM has sent me to you.’” Authority is attributed to the ontological identity of 
God, just as truth is attributed to the ontological identity of Christ in John 14:6. 
Ontological identity is the source of truth and the criteria according to which truth 
can be measured.  
In the biblical quotes mentioned above, truth is fundamentally something 
that exists independent of how we humans perceive or have the ability to perceive 
reality. For this reason, when truth is articulated into doctrinal symbols, i.e. when 
the implications of  “I am the truth” are cross-referenced with the biblical 
narrative of salvation rendered complete in the identity of Jesus Christ in order to 
regulate152 (render) its meaningful interpretation within the Christian community, 
it inevitably comes in the form of communicated truth. For Lindbeck the 
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important aspect of communicated truth, is that it happens for a regulatory 
purpose in its role as a communal doctrine and thus has intent inbuilt rather than 
specific affirmations concerning the truth it is communicating. From this 
perspective doctrines serve in outlining the specific, not stating or declaring it.153 
It regulates how we understand the specific which is unfolding and in doing so 
protects dogma from unbelief rather than declaring the faith in the way of 
declaring objective truth. This is one reason Lindbeck understands the formation 
of communally authoritative doctrines as the hermeneutical key to understanding 
their regulative nature. 
It also implies that it has undergone conditioning by the recipients of the 
truth. Lindbeck’s thought it is to say it has taken the form of cultural-linguistic 
grammar, which is determining in guiding the understanding of religiously 
meaningful truth in a given community. The reality of this conditioning intrinsic 
to the process of communication concerns itself with the gap in knowledge 
concerning truth and its correspondence with the source of truth. This can be 
thought of as a theologically axiomatic position from which Lindbeck’s cultural 
linguistic perspective into religious truth begins to take its theological shape. It 
resonates with a theistic realism, which holds that truth and knowledge of truth 
only coincide in God, because only in God are they directly known to correspond. 
154 Reality and knowledge of reality cannot be in a contradictory relationship in an 
entity, which is taken as the source of truth in itself. From this realism we can 
approach Lindbeck’s understanding of language in terms of its substance. 
In the overarching CL understanding of Christianity, Christian language is 
equated with confessing Jesus as Lord and with the language of the coming 
kingdom. Christian language in this way extends from the very first confessions 
of “Christ is the Lord”, which is a doctrinal and creedal statement, to the coming 
kingdom in which confessing the Lord is a prerequisite.155 A shared property of 
Christian language at both ends of the spectrum is that Christian language speaks 
of and for Christ. Christian language serves in this technical sense as model of 
Christian identity and can therefore be equated with it, because it is understood to 
originate from Christ. Christian language is a reflection of Christ’s identity.  
The above can be pictured in a linear sense whereby Christ is at both ends, 
so to speak, of a salvific reality (or a cultural linguistic entity in purely 
                                                
153 ND 94, Lindbeck 2004, 15. 
154 Lindbeck 1989, 404. 
155 ND 60. 
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nontheological technical terms). Christ can be seen as the starting point and 
fulfilment/goal of Christian identity. At the beginning of the arch, Christ is 
confessed of for the benefit of the other and at the other end the confessors are for 
Christ (i.e. pro-Christ). In other words, what is received eventually transforms into 
an encompassing reality of giving. Christ encompasses the entirety of Christian 
language in a transformatory manner.  
The confessing Christian community in this linear depiction is always in a 
sense in between Christ, because salvation begins and reaches it goal in Christ. A 
Christian is therefore someone that participates in an economy of salvation that is 
constituted by the salvific economic grammar rendered in the language of Christ. 
Speaking the Christian language is being in-between the constitution and the 
rendering of the coming kingdom of Christ. As the above logic indicates, Christ is 
the substance of what is in-between which makes the perspective of Christ as the 
linguistic medium of a Christian community ontologically logical even though it 
leaves the criteria for judging its practical manifestations still wide open. The 
question we turn to now is how this cultural-linguistic medium relates to the 
world in practise and how does it account for the complexity of the context in 


















4. Text, world, and the world of the Text 
This chapter attempts to deal with how the relation between the text and the world 
in understood in the understanding of community described in the previous 
chapter. In order to identify the dimensions, which require clarity in the cultural 
linguistic understanding of this relation, it discusses criticism, which is directly 
aimed at the way in which Lindbeck accounts for this relation.  
Understanding Christianity as a language brings to light three aspects of 
Lindbeck’s understanding of theological intratextuality according to DeHart. 
Firstly, its semiotic aspect implies that the concepts, which prevail in a given 
community, are understood in terms of the community’s intrasystemic usage of 
them. Second, the reality encompassing aspect implies, given Lindbeck’s 
understanding of the role of religious language as a framework for ultimate 
orientation, that the usages which can encompass and structure one’s experience 
of reality are purposefully deployed in that respect. Thirdly, scriptural 
intratextuality implies that a collection of texts is given authoritative status in 
providing a paradigm of the grammatical system of the ecclesial “language” and 
its use in construing the world.156 
In an essay titled “Theology, Meaning and Power”, Volf sees Lindbeck’s 
ND as something that brings theology and method together in a complimentary 
manner. By this he is highlighting that the method is part of the message of the 
ND. The message in itself, which Volf defines primarily as renewing faith in the 
ancient practice of absorbing the universe into the biblical world and in this way 
make the inner logic of the Christian narrative the guiding principle of a Christian 
community, has a twofold intention in that it intends to instruct as well as 
empower theologians in their engagements with the church and their diverse 
cultural contexts. In other words, according to Volf, Lindbeck wants to 
communicate a type of a road map together with the technical apparatus for 
travelling the road in one package.157 
For Volf, Lindbeck’s attempt is flawed because it does not realistically 
account for the complexity of communal reality in which we exist.158 Volf 
understands Lindbeck’s metaphor of inhabiting the intratextual world of the bible, 
which positions one to absorb the world into the biblical world, as inadequate 
                                                
156 DeHart 2006, 159-160. 
157 Volf 1996, 45. 
158 Volf 1996, 48. 
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because it does not account for how this inhabiting is in turn conditioned by the 
extratextual world. Volf seems to understand Lindbeck as coming dangerously 
close to advocating an understanding that inhabiting the biblical world somehow 
guarantees an interpretation based on the biblical world as being free of 
extratextual filters and distortions. As a result, Volf proposes that Lindbeck’s 
model should be improved in this respect and it would come in the form of 
integrating an admission that “we always inhabit more than the intratextual world 
and that we never quite absorb the extratextual world”.159 
It is debatable whether Volf overlooks an implicit assumption in Lindbeck’s 
model that is rather axiomatic in the ND, and therefore of integral significance. 
Volf admits he might be pressing Lindbeck’s metaphors too far in his criticism,160 
especially when one takes into account that Lindbeck explicitly understands 
Christianised social constructs of realities as being far from identical. Furthermore 
Lindbeck goes on to say that it is at most the significatum (what is used to signify 
something e.g. God is good), not the modus significatum (how what is being used 
to signify something actually materialises), which remains the same in the diverse 
manifestations of the biblical narrative.161  
Noteworthy here is the ‘at most’ Lindbeck uses. In other words, the 
interpretations of narratives can vary in their interpretation as well as form when 
different worlds are redescribed within the one and same framework of biblical 
narratives.162 Lindbeck discloses this more explicitly in an article concerning 
atonement and the hermeneutics of intratextual social embodiment, when he says 
that for the most part of Christian history, the process of absorbing the world into 
the biblical world distorted the biblical world, and at times very badly. Lindbeck’s 
limited and primary emphasis is in other words concerned with the reality that 
scriptures were used to structure communities and worldviews, which aimed at 
making the varying social, cultural and intellectual milieus of believing 
communities biblically intelligible.  How successful they were in using scriptures 
for this purpose with respect to theological faithfulness to the text remains a 
                                                
159 Volf 1996, 52. 
160 This is understandable as Volf is attempting to construct a new improved methodological 
outlook by using Lindbeck as a starting point. Exaggerations might be necessary inorder to address 
the points he wants to focus on. Volf 1996, 46. 
161 ND 82.  
162 According to Vanhoozer Lindbeck takes a fateful step when he extends his analogous use of 
Wittgenstein to apply for narratives in the same way as ‘practice gives words their sense’. 
According to Vanhoozer, if one understands the meaning of stories as being a function of their use 
within the community, it collapses the intratextual meaning of the narrative into its reception. 
Vanhoozer 2005, 96. 
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separate issue for Lindbeck, and it seems the effects of extratextual reality are 
consequently accounted for with an almost taken-for-granted constancy with 
Lindbeck. (I.e. one always begins with one’s cultural lenses, but inhabiting the 
world of the bible is what ultimately has the power to affect how one sees oneself 
and others in the world.) A possible reason as to why Lindbeck does not go into 
great lengths to make this more explicit in the ND, and why Volf consequently 
wants to modify Lindbeck’s model in this very respect, is that Volf wants to 
emphasize the textual world of the bible as “a strange word mapping a strange 
world”. Volf wants criteria with which to keep this strangeness intact, because if 
we are aware that we can never totally inhabit the biblical world it helps guard the 
irreducible externality of the textual world. Lindbeck, on the other hand, sees it 
pragmatically and in a more immediate sense as a strange new way of relating to 
the world in the world. This relating to the world is more a case of focusing 
through the Scripture, not on Scripture itself. The scripture acts as a hermeneutical 
lens and using scripture to interpret life is what is understood as relevant biblical 
interpretation. This does not mean for Lindbeck that this makes biblical 
interpretation ‘fail safe’ from projecting one’s own ideas into the biblical 
narratives and as a result thinking mistakenly that they are part of the intratextual 
meaning, which Volf would say runs the danger of domesticating the strange new 
world.163 What it does mean, contrary to historically /psychologically 
/philosophically critical readings of the bible, is that intratextual hermeneutics 
struggles against the reflex of consciously employing extratextual meanings as 
hermeneutical keys. Strangeness is something intrinsic to the struggle, and in this 
way witnesses strangeness to the world in that it does not, as a rule, resort to using 
psychologically or philosophically familiar concepts. In other words, relating to 
the world through scripture intends on being intratextual to the best of one’s 
awareness and knowledge in order to disclose the narrative to the best of one’s 
ability.164  
                                                
163 Lindbeck makes this point also concerning Barth’s intratextual efforts. It is evident that Barth 
read his own world into the bible on occasions, also including central issues like his doctrine of 
revelation. However, this does not mean automatically that all that has been ‘baptized into the 
biblical world’ instead of being derived from it, is biblically unfaithful. Biblically faithfulness 
varies in degree and in terms of success and can take various forms. See Lindbeck 1986, 367-368. 
Lindbeck also notes that for most people through Christian history the world of the bible was not 
strange or new. “Once they entered it, they experienced it as the world in which they lived, which 
was embodied in their communities and churches, and which absorbed all other worlds.” Lindbeck 
1996, 226. 
164 Lindbeck 1996, 226-228, 239. Volf 1996, 52. Vanhoozer sums similar criticism towards 
Lindbeck from the perspective of where do correct doctrinal rules of speech come from. (the text 
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The pragmatic criteria for discerning the faithfulness to subject matter rests 
ultimately on the fruit of the intratextual hermeneutics.165  However, when fruit 
are given authority in declaring the faithfulness of intratextual hermeneutics, the 
necessity of defining these fruit arises and therefore something theologically 
substantial must guide this process of recognizing what fruit can be considered 
good fruit.  
The pragmatic emphasis present off course has its difficulties. If one takes 
pragmatism to the extreme, it will tie up truth with practicality. The logic of truth 
in itself becomes secondary to what has been practically determined as true. 
Truthfulness itself would no longer rely on explanation, but on good performance. 
The fruits of this performance are the only real evidence on the basis of which to 
judge the success of the performance. With respect to truth, the problem becomes 
imminent: how then to judge what are desired fruit i.e. what can be understood as 
evidence in support of what is desired? This is only possible if certain goals are 
understood as criteria i.e. as truthful aspirations. Having aspirations that are 
deemed capable of judging performances subsequently require a paradigm of 
thought which has inbuilt axioms that are assumed true without the practical test 
of their validity. 
In the light of this difficulty, Lindbeck’s solution is interesting. Whatever 
“serves the up building of the community of faith in its God-willed witness to the 
world is the one (interpretation) to be preferred”. Success is judged by ability to 
witness God’s will which is intrinsic to the specific role of the Christian 
community.166 This is why Lindbeck talks of perceiving religion as a single 
gigantic proposition.167  
                                                                                                                                 
or the community). Postliberal theology is according to Vanhoozer mostly concerned with 
socializing persons into a set of authoritative communal practices. Lindbeck offers nothing to 
prevent this process of socializing speech about God from simply reflecting the cultural 
conventions already existing in the church. For this reason, Vanhoozer claims doctrine in 
Lindbeck’s regulative theory does not direct the community, but is directed by it. Vanhoozer 2005, 
96-97. 
165 This is because Lindbeck aligns himself with the traditions of thought that “use largely 
determines meaning”. For example the intratextual meaning of the cross is indefinate to a 
community until the hermeneutical circle is completed through “..the social-ritual-experiental 
enactments as taking up the cross, or bearing the cross, or being baptized into Christ’s death so that 
we might rise with him” This adaptation into a particular social setting renders the meaning in an 
intelligible way, and thus makes it usable for the community. Lindbeck 1996, 227. ND 33, 36, 62, 
66-68, 136. In this sense, adaptation proposes meaning. 
166 The purpose of witness keeps the community working for Christ by keeping it missional, and 
not for its own communal success per se, which simultabeaously keeps in check the communal 
tendencies of self-satisfaction, i.e successful according to extratextual standards. What is being 
witnessed is therefore of uptmost importance to Lindbeck since that is the crucial relationship to 
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”As actually lived, a religion may be pictures as a single gigantic proposition. It is a 
true proposition to the extent that its objectivities are interiorised and exercised by 
groups and individuals in such a way as to conform them in some measure in the 
various dimensions of their existence to the ultimate reality and goodness that lies in 
the heart of things. It is a false proposition to the extent that it does not happen.”168 
 
What this God-willed witness is would logically be the question, which requires 
an answer and a very broad theological one. It is interesting that Lindbeck turns to 
atonement to tackle this issue of discerning God-willed success. Approaching this 
question via the theme of atonement enables to focus on how the success of Christ 
becomes the success of His witnesses, which then renders the meaning of success, 
i.e. success comes through participation in success. In other words, successful 
witnessing as criteria for assessing the fruit is witnessing Christ’s atoning work, 
which is, in its vast theological significance, above all the ontological culmination 
of God’s reconciling will. Witnessing the reality of reconciliation seems to be 
basic purpose of any Christian community. This basic purpose is explicitly 
evident in Lindbeck’s anticipatory vision of the future, in which he sees the 
message of the cross acting like a magnet which draws Christians together from 
different traditions.169  
This movement has a technical correlation with Lindbeck’s understanding 
of how people became Christians in the early days of the Christian church. They 
were at first attracted to the Christian community and its form of life. Only after 
the initial attraction was understanding the faith a priority and happened within 
the community. This ran contrary to Gnostics who tried by resdecribing biblical 
material in new interpretive frameworks to render Christianity understandable and 
thus attractive to the outside, and in this sense witnessed primarily to man instead 
of Christ. In Lindbeck’s vision of the future, it is witnessing the message of the 
                                                                                                                                 
the extratextual world which often is overlooked or simply not seen. For eg. See Dulles 2003, 60-
61 on relativism charge. 
167 ND 51. 
168 ND 51. 
169 Lindbeck 1996, 230, 240. Lindbeck’s description here almost sounds like an anticipated or 
hoped for grassroots manifesation of ‘reconciliation without capitulation’. The cross reconciles our 
diversity as movement towards the cross which unites one to an other. The power of the cross is 
that it has the capacity to unite divisions. When this happens on a doctrinal basis, as it has in 
ecumenical dialogues, it literally happens only on a doctrinal level. However, understanding that 
reconciliation has occured to a given extent on a doctrinal level, despite counterparts remaining in 
their own traditions, is evidence (!) of the reality of reconciliation. This might be a reason why 
Lindbeck so strongly wants to advocate the principle of reconciliation without capitulation. It is 
like a cloud of hope which will rain down once it condenses as a result of further dialogue and 
successful implementation. 
 58 
cross which attracts Christians from different communities toward reconciliation, 
and thus towards understanding the mystery of reconciliation.170  
Volf is along the same lines also critical towards Lindbeck’s understanding 
of Christian faith simply as a CL or semiotic system. According to Volf, it is as 
such incapable of examining questions such as what is the force behind the 
emergence of a Christian semiotic system? What keeps it alive do the things we 
witness it do? What is the place of power in the embracing of the Christian faith?  
In short, Volf is asking what can the life of semiotic system be attributed to? What 
moves it? This criticism is warranted, because when it comes to understanding 
religion as a cultural system, Lindbeck aligns himself explicitly with Geertz in 
that religion, just like culture, is not a power to which events of the cross could be 
causally attributed to.171  
Because of Lindbeck’s lack of explicit exploration into how the world 
affects the semiotic system, Volf sees the powers at play as remaining 
categorically and therefore inherently in the shadows. The tools of Volf’s 
argumentation come by making the distinction between the semiotic and 
nonsemiotic aspects of Christian life and life in general. He justifies this 
distinction by stating that the semiotic dimensions of church life are powerless 
without the nonsemiotic dimensions, just as the nonsemiotic dimensions are 
meaningless without the semiotic dimensions. The legitimating of this distinction 
is derived from the initial emergence of the Christian semiotic system. Volf states 
with rhetoric vigour that:  
 
“God did not send us a “semiotic system” so that we might see the world and behave 
in it differently, but became flesh and suffered on the cross in order to redeem and 
transform the world. The place where the Christian “semiotic system” emerges is the 
history of God with the world, a history that is more than a network of discursive 
and nondiscursive intersignifications.”   
 
One can sense the insufficiency Volf wishes to indicate towards Lindbeck’s 
understanding of Christianity as a semiotic system. Vainio suggests that Volf has 
a tendency to regard Lindbeck’s perspective as exhaustive in its intentíons,172 
which might serve in understanding the reason as to why Volf sees it as 
inadequate to begin with. Volf’s critic can then likewise be considered very 
holistic. Concerning the history of Jesus Christ, Volf wants to stress that even 
                                                
170 ND 132, Lindbeck 1996, 240. 
171 ND 115. Volf 1996, 55,57. Geertz 1973, 13-16. 
172 Vainio 2010, 74.  
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though it is only accessible with the help of a system of intersignifications, what is 
accessed is more than that. In other words, what is accessed is at the end of the 
day nonsemiotic, which emphasises that ultimately salvation is not accessed, but 
received, because it is semiotically beyond reach. I.e. Salvation is not knowledge, 
but knowledge that has become personally meaningful that leads one to trust in 
the salvation the knowledge mediates.173  
In order to understand the significance this nonsemiotic dimension of faith, 
a theory concerning the location of a Christian needs to account better for the 
complex reality present as a result of different semiotic systems being intertwined 
in multiple relations of power.174 According to Volf, instead of talking about a 
cultural-linguistic system when we talk about Christian faith in the world, we 
should talk about structures, forces and experiences. It is important to note Volf’s 
selection of bible verses when it comes to arguing that a Geertzian reading of 
Lindbeck promotes exactly the inverse of what the Bible does. Volf writes:  
 
“...a significant contrast emerges between how Lindbeck and how the New Testament (and the 
Christian tradition) speak of the location of Christians. There we read, of course, nothing of 
inhabiting a “cultural-linguistic system” or “texts”. Much more prosaically, we are told that 
Christian live on the other hand, “in Corinth” or “in Rome” and, on the other hand in some 
mysterious way also “in God” or “in Christ”. They inhabit both “Corinth” and “God”, “Rome” and 
“Christ”, at one and the same time. It is not that the New Testament is ignorant of the relationship 
between Christians and the language of faith. But the relationship is exactly the inverse of the one 
Lindbeck postulates between Christians and the Christian “story”: the “word of Christ” is 
supposed to “dwell in [them] richly” (Col 3:16), not they in the word of Christ; they, “the holy and 
faithful brothers [and sisters]”, dwell in that peculiar double habitation described with the unusual 
phrase “in Christ at Colossae” (Col 1:2). 
 
Volf wishes to state in this perspective that inhabiting God and Rome at the 
same time is different to inhabiting a semiotic system, which would in some way 
encompass both worlds. Both, the effects of dwelling in God and dwelling in 
Rome, need to be accounted for when understanding a Christian’s location, and a 
single semiotic system cannot do what requires to be done on two fronts. At this 
point, it is debatable if Volf chooses to overlook the pragmatic intentions in 
Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic perspective. This overlooking is partially debatable 
on the basis of his selection of citations from the bible. Volf specifically states 
                                                
173 Volf 1996, 54,57.;  Volf 1998, 163. 
174 In this critic of Lindbeck, Volf aligns himself with Talal Asad’s critic of Geertz, who objects to 
Geertz for precisely the reason that his understanding of culture disregards the issue of power. 
Volf’s critic against Lindbeck seems to have it roots in a different understanding of culture, or 
atleast Volf uses culture to mean more than what Lindbeck does. Volf 1996, 51, 54, 56.  
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that according to the New Testament, the relationship between Christians and the 
word of Christ is exactly the inverse of what Lindbeck postulates.  
Volf declares on the basis of the bible verses that Christians are not to dwell 
in the word of Christ, but rather the word of Christ is supposed to dwell in 
Christians. If we compare Volf’s perspective to Jesus’ words in John 15:4 
“Remain in me, and I will remain in you”, a different perspective arises to the one 
offered in Volf’s argumentation. Here, dwelling in Christ and Christ dwelling in 
us is portrayed in principle as a mutual reality, which is implied in the 
conditionality communicated by Christ. If we want Christ to keep dwelling in us, 
we must dwell in him. It does imply that Christ dwells amongst people before 
people dwell in him since Jesus uses the word “remain”, which is theologically 
constituted by incarnation, and in this way Volf’s argues for the prerequisite of 
John 15:4, but in order for Christ to continue dwelling in Christians, Jesus says 
they must keep dwelling in Him. In other words when we dwell in Christ, we are 
dwelling in “Christ dwelling in our reality”, which implies Christ is a reality, 
which has already taken on our reality in its totality. Christ is from this 
perspective ‘God dwelling in the world’. Dwelling in Christ is dwelling in a 
salvific relationship with the world. This implies that the mutual indwelling 
advocated by Christ is a Christ-dependent reality just as salvation, which implies 
that dwelling in Christ is witnessing to Christ. Witnessing is the verification of 
Christ dwelling in them richly. This would correlate with Lindbeck’s 
understanding of a Christian community as a witnessing community. Witnessing 
is what keeps the church doing the task it was given in Christ. It is a mutual 
indwelling in which Christ is the leading partner: when the community relates to 
Christ, it relates to itself in a God willed way. 
This is more explicitly implied by for e.g. John 15:7, where the same logic 
is applied to words: “If you remain in me and my words remain in you, ask 
whatever you wish, and it will be done for you” and in John 15:5 the same logic 
has similarly been applied to that of witness: “I am the vine; you are the branches. 
If you remain in me and I in you, you will bear much fruit; apart from me you can 
do nothing.” If we consider Christ in himself as a cultural linguistic system which 
embodies both human and divine nature in the sense that God incarnated as a 
semiotic system, which is precisely what Volf deems is an insufficient perspective 
into Christ, these verses from the gospel of John can be considered as pragmatic 
perspectives for how this semiotic system is to relate to the world in the way of an 
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intrinsic paradigm. It does not contradict Volf like was shown in the previous 
paragraph, but the perspective is practical. These principles imply an inbuilt 
relation to other semiotic systems. It declares a starting point from which to begin 
to relate to other realities.  Following this, all realities other than the one given, 
fall under one category, which Volf on the other hand is very critical of because it 
puts all culture under a monolithic whole which leaves the inherent cultural 
diversity and its implications in the shadows. For Lindbeck this is justified, 
because Lindbeck has inbuilt in his model the way in which culture technically 
regulates life, not how the effects of the cultural context are to be accounted for 
with respect to the articulation of a religion in a different context. Therefore what 
Lindbeck is possibly focusing on is what differentiates Christian regulation of life 
from all other regulatory schemes we are constantly under the effect of whilst 
living in the world. A pragmatic reading of “in Christ at Colossae” (which suits 
Volf), would read perhaps as “in Christ for Colossae” (which most probably 
would suit Lindbeck) which does not alter the meaning175, but instead emphasizes 
what dwelling in Christ entails: being for the other. What this being is, is the 
important theological question. But for Lindbeck it is not primarily the being in 
itself, which is to be focused on, but what renders this being. This being is 
rendered in the depictions of God’s character as an agent in the stories of Israel 
and Jesus. The believer is to be conformed to the agency of Jesus Christ depicted 
in the narrative.176 Lindbeck writes: 
 
“..the primary function of the canonical narrative.. ..is “to render a character.., offer 
an identity description of an agent,” namely God. It does this not by telling what 
God is in and of himself, but by accounts of the interaction of his deeds and 
purposes with those of creatures in their everchanging circumstances. These 
accounts reach their climax in what the Gospels say of the risen, ascended and ever-
present Jesus Christ whose identity as the divine-human agent is unsubstitutably 
enacted in the stories of Jesus of Nazareth. The climax, however, is logically 
inseparable from what precedes it.”177 
                                                
175 A possible reason as to why Rome and God can be considered accounted for in one semiotic 
system, is that the relation between God and the world, which has been reconciled in Christ, 
overrides the diversity of cultural differences/variations. This does not imply they have not been 
accounted for, but rather those differences are precisely those we are called to encounter within the 
semiotic system. 
176 ND 120-121. A possible Geertzian reading of 15:4, keeping in mind Geertz’s of/for aspects of a 
model, could read as  “if you are of me” (as a consquence of one remaining in Christ), “I am for 
you” (I remain in you) Looked at in this way Christ is perceivable as the model of salvation in the 
Geertzian sense. 
177 ND 121.(italics added) This climax being logically inseparable from what precedes it implies 
that the frame of reference and the center of the narrative are both narrational. Lindbeck 1996, 228. 
Vanhoozer sees the emphasis that Jesus is the literal subject of the gospel narratives, and that only 
going through these narratives can one get to their subject matter, as the narrative imperative 
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In other words, Christ is an instance of double habitation in His divine-human 
nature and in being so ties together the vertical and horizontal aspects of faith in 
order for the faith to be witnessing faith, which is of central importance to the 
communal nature of Christianity and especially Lindbeck’s ecclesiology, which 
for example Hutter argues is inversely determinable already on the basis of ND. 
According to DeHart, witness is Lindbeck’s dominant concept for understanding 
Christian ecclesial existence. Understanding the church as similar to language is 
Lindbeck’s dominant metaphor for guiding the church in understanding itself as a 
witnessing community. In this way Lindbeck’s ecclesiology serves as a 
conceptual conjunction between theories of salvation, Christology and religious 
language. Ecclesiology is where it all comes together for Lindbeck.178 
This communal witnessing/proclaiming character of faith, in the form of 
being for the other in a constitutive way, Volf agrees with respect to the mediation 
of faith.179 According to Volf, the essentially communal character of the 
mediation of faith is most clearly symbolized in the administration of sacraments, 
which no person can self-administer. Volf further aligns himself with Lindbeck in 
that it is only through participating in the life of a confessing congregation that 
one discovers the meaning of the confession. But in contrast, Volf says that the 
semiotic system is meaningful only if it leads one to trust in God. For Volf, the 
need to stress this distinction comes from emphasising trust (fiducia) in Christ as 
solely a gift of the Holy Spirit, which is in effect a nonsemiotic happening. In 
Lindbeck’s perspective this trust is an inbuilt feature of the language of Jesus 
Christ. Lindbeck’s logic is more along the lines of –the more one understands, the 
more one trusts, but all trusting is real hearing i.e. faith-. DeHart sums Lindbeck 
in this respect that being able to speak of Christ and to experience the salvation of 
Christ are one and the same thing for Lindbeck.180 It then makes sense, that 
Lindbeck understands the Holy Spirit, the verbum internum, in accordance with 
the cultural-linguistic model as a capacity for hearing the true external word. This 
implies an interconnection between the Word and the Spirit.181 The question we 
then turn to in more detail is how then does Lindbeck account for the reality of 
                                                                                                                                 
behind Lindbeck’s contention that” it is the text, so to speak, which absorbes the world, rather than 
the world the text.” ND 118. Vanhoozer 2002, 216. 
178 Hutter 1997, 65-68. DeHart 2006, 154 
179 Volf 1998, 163. 
180 DeHart 2006, 155. See ND 60-61. 
181 ND 34.  
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this nonsemiotic dimension of Christian faith in his cultural linguistic model of 
faith.  
Wainwright puts forward this important and revealing question concerning 
the origins of cultural linguistic traditions. He is basically asking that, since inner 
experience is according to the CL model a derivative of the outer and in this sense 
inner experience can in its informative value be reduced to the outer since it had 
enabled the communication of that experience, what are these cultural linguistic 
traditions which are granted the authoritative status in guiding our identities then 
reducible to. If it is simply a given, then it needs to be asked what exactly is it that 
is given i.e. is it concepts or rather a way of conceptualising. Where does the 
authority for this givenness subside? How can the relationship between the outer 
and inner remain truly dialectical, if the outer is granted a leading role? Or more 
precisely where does a realism that the outer precedes the inner come from. What 
outer determined this specific ‘outer’ which is similarly intrinsic to the outer?182 
This is an important question also because one central weakness in modern 
theology is in Lindbeck’s view that this question of origin is bypassed on a 
technical level altogether because it is intrinsically deemed irrelevant in the EE 
understanding of Christian language: original experience originates from the 
prereflective self and therefore even any hypothetically possible answer to the 
question of origin of this prereflective originality is unreflectable. Therefore the 
unreflectable has to be supposed real, which forms the basis for holding that all 
religions are basically similar. This does not make sense from a CL perspective 
because it forces the outer to be a derivative of the inner.183 
Lindbeck speaks of Christian language as something which has the capacity 
to transmit the reality of a new being i.e. a Christian: a creature created anew 
through Christ. He correlates becoming a Christian with the acquiring of a 
language.184 Just as an individual becomes human by learning a language, so too 
does a human become a Christian through hearing and interiorising the language 
that speaks of Christ. However it is not language like any other, even though 
                                                
182 Wainwright 1988, 123-124. I will not go into Wainrigth’s analysis of how Lindbeck answers 
this question because it focuses on doctrinal issues which are not as such the focus of this study, 
but rather take his cue in that Lindbeck hints towards Sellars in this respect for an overarching 
perspective.  
183 Barrett 1988, 157-158. ND 41. From Lindbeck’s CL perspective, also empirical reasoning 
offered for the existence of this basic similarity in the religious core of religions cannot 
compensate for the basic weaknesses it has inbuilt. For Lindbeck’s assessments of such attempts, 
See ND 41-42.     
184 ND, 62. 
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technically the analogy is enough to describe the communal way in which faith is 
transmitted in practise. The most telling point in this analogy is that the 
acquisition of a language –“necessarily from the outside”-, has its origin in 
something that Lindbeck attributes to something that is as transformatory and 
significant in its nature as “the jump which was the coming into being of man”. In 
this quote, Lindbeck refers to Willfrid Sellars, who is referring to a hypothetical 
event in the history of humankind when, in short, something happened which 
unleashed the power of human imagination.  
This something entailed the transition from pre-conceptual patterns of 
behaviour to conceptual thinking, which correlates with man encountering himself 
and becoming aware of himself as man.185 At this hypothetical moment, man had 
gained the capacity and capability, which differentiates him from whatever he was 
before this event. This leap was in its substance the acquisition of the capacity and 
ability to conceptualise, the ability to learn a language, to think and to 
communicate conceptually. Ontologically it is implying that suddenly something 
was that was not there before and this something was not in any way a derivative 
of what was before. The new capacity exists on its own terms. Because of the 
holistic nature and integral consequences of this assumed leap in the capacity of 
man, the ability of thinking conceptually is concluded by Sellars as being 
something irreducible.186  
Lindbeck’s analogous use of Sellars then implies that along with Christ 
came something that has rendered all our preconceptions concerning God invalid. 
If becoming human meant for Sellars that man became conceptually capable of 
encountering himself as man, then becoming Christian in the ND correlates with 
man becoming conceptually capable (through becoming linguistically informed) 
of encountering God. This is a logical correlation, because according to Sellars, 
the leap to conceptual thinking from preconceptual behaviour cannot be perceived 
as the coming together of parts somehow already conceptual in their character. 
The shift was holistic and qualitatively distinct in nature in which the new whole 
was not only greater than the sum of its parts, but also ontologically and 
                                                
185 Here Sellars thoughts correlates with Berger’s more communal version the same logic in that 
according to Berger, language has its origin in the face-to-face situation: encounter brings about 
the birth of language. For Berger too, language is only language when as a vocal expression it 
gains the ability to detatch from the immediate “here and now” of subjective states vocally 
expressed for eg. by “snarling, grunting, howling or hissing.” Ability to detatch correlates with 
Sellars’ ability to conceptualise. B&L 1966, 51-52. 
186 Sellars 1963, 6.  
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substantially different in the sense that in Sellar’s depiction animal became man. 
From this perspective it could be argued that Lindbeck’s reservedness with 
respect to ontology, which is reflected in its apparent inconclusivity, correlates 
with the inbuilt Christocentric implications of his cultural linguistic approach to 
religion in a way that can be argued as paralleling Luther’s realism with respect to 
the doing of theology.187  
McGrath opens up the core of Luther’s theology of the cross with respect to 
pre-revelatory notions of divine reality. In McGrath’s analysis of Luther, one can 
see the similarity of the technical apparatus Lindbeck puts forward for facilitating 
the necessity of revelation with Luther’s revelational counterpart to a doctrine of 
grace. 
Alister McGrath summarises Luther’s theology of the Cross as a form of a 
calculated and systematic attack on the role of a priori notions of God in any form 
of theology that wishes to be considered Christian. The way in which God 
revealed himself to humanity on the cross, i.e. through shame, weakness, 
foolishness, represents a divine decision to overturn the human preconceptions of 
the divine nature in order to reveal to humanity the conceptual incompetence of its 
theological resources. In this way, the cross educates Christians by permeating 
their preunderstandings of God by permeating the home and origin of their 
incompetence. According to McGrath, Christianity is for Luther fundamentally 
such that we need to be told. We do not have the ability to determine in advance 
the true nature of God. This epistemic critique of human capabilities in 
articulating God is according to McGrath a revelational counterpart to a doctrine 
of grace whereby humanity lacks the soteriological resources to justify itself. This 
lack forces one to rely on the grace of God for salvation.  In correlation, humanity 
does not have the epistemic resources to grasp God and is therefore forced to rely 
on revelation, and its ontological culmination in Christ, for knowledge of God. 
Humanity depends on God to know God and to know about God. The essential 
prerequisite for being able to conceptually retrieve true knowledge of God is the 
                                                
187 If one keeps in mind, that Lindbeck understands the Holy Spirit as the capacity to hear the 
external world of salvation and that this capacity is part and parcel of participating in the language 
of Christ (analogous use of Sellars above), then Lindbeck’s understanding of doctrine could be 
understood to be correlating with Luther in the sense that Lindbeck’s understanding of doctrine is 
paradigmatically pneumatological because it is only understandable when paying reference to the 
very thing it is depicting: the presence of the Lord. Mannermaa 2000, 192.  McGrath sees 
Lindbeck’s understanding concerning the coming into being of the Christian idiom as being an 
evasion of the central question concerning the origin of  revelation because it fails to distuingish 
whether it originates from accumulated human insight or the self-disclosure of God in the Christ-
event. McGrath 1990, 28. 
 66 
abandonment of any preconceived ideas concerning God’s nature, which have 
their basis in fallen creation. In this way Christ becomes the ontological principle 
and point of ontological reference through which something can be ontologically 
verified. 188  
In interpreting John 14:6 “No-one comes to the father except through me”, 
Lindbeck’s understanding of salvation is clearly expressed with regard to semiotic 
understanding. Applying the notion of prospective salvation, Lindbeck expresses 
his hope, and in line with salvation’s dependency on semiotic understanding 
expects, that God will see to it that in the final consummation everyone [those of 
different religion as well as no religion at all] will learn the Christian language 
well enough to acknowledge that Jesus Christ is indeed Lord and ultimately the 
only way. Here salvation is explicitly linked with understanding, and 
acknowledgement is the end result, which is rendered through understanding.189 In 
other words, if one really understands Christ and what Christ renders about 
humanity and one’s footing in that corporate human reality, rejection is not a true 
option, but only a truly false one. Understanding the language of Christ makes 
salvation a necessity, though not an unrejectable necessity. It remains a gift.190  
This is evident in Lindbeck’s understanding of prospective salvation with 
respect to the religious other. It brings the relation between the world and the 
cultural-linguistic world of the text into sharp contrast. Lindbeck writes: 
  
In terms of the basic NT eschatological pictures, non- Christians (i.e., Gentiles) 
would seem not yet to be confronted by the question of salvation: they are not 
heading toward either heaven or hell; they have no future, but are still trapped in the 
past, in the darkness of the old aeon. Only through the message of the coming 
kingdom, of God’s Messiah, does the new age, the true future of the world, become 
real for them, and only then does either final redemption or final damnation become 
possible 
 
One sometimes get the impression that the Bible balances Cyprian’s claim that there 
is no salvation outside the church (extra ecclesia nulla salus) with an at least equally 
emphatic insistence that the beginning of damnation, of deliberate opposition to 
God, is possible only within the church, within the people of God: Jesus pronounced 
his woes (and wept), it will be recalled, over the cities of Israel, not those of the 
Gentiles. On this view, there is no damnation –just as there is no salvation- outside 
the church. One must, in other words, learn the language of faith before one can 
know enough about its message knowingly to reject it and thus be lost. 
 
                                                
188 McGrath 2002, 278-279. 
189 Lindbeck 2006, 30. 
190 ND 58-59. Lindbeck’s position here with respect to the relationship between understanding and 
salvation seems to resonate with Jesus’s words on the cross: “Father, forgive them, for they do not 
know what they are doing.” (Luke 23:34).  
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If we look at these exerts, there is an exclusively intratextual and 
intrasystemic element to Christianity, which has to do with true knowledge. The 
theologically loaded statement, that one must learn the language of faith in order 
to be within the reality where any possible decisions for or against the message of 
salvation have any significance, does not leave a lot of room to understand salvific 
reality in a way that lets it exist independent of how we relate to it, because 
salvation is explicitly linked only to the world in which such concepts have 
validity. Lindbeck’s realism here follows his interpretation of Paul in the sense 
that faith comes from hearing,191 which implies that saving faith is communicated 
to one from the outside: it is revealed. Explicit hearing is a necessity. If one has 
not heard one cannot know. Since knowing is dependent in a very fundamental 
way on participating in the semiotic universe which emerged in Christ, as shown 
earlier in this chapter, everything exists in the modality of hope, in an anticipated 
future. One, in a sense, remembers the future in order to exist in this modality of 
hope.  
However it is of utmost importance to note that this has nothing to do with 
wishful thinking in the sense that all there is, is hope. The hope is an ontological 
derivative of the objectively true and concrete reality that Christ has been raised 
from the dead and that reality exists totally independent of what anyone wishes or 
hopes for in life. But this reality, when present in the life of a Christian through 
hearing the message of salvation, exists as a modality of hope. In other words 
hope in Christ is substantial in contrast to wishful thinking, which is relative to 
one’s own projections. In this sense Lindbeck’s model does not fall into 
relativism, which has often been levelled against him.192 The intrasystemic 
attention given to the nature of salvation seems to correlate with the attention 
given to the intrasystemic nature of truth. According to Lindbeck this is an 
inevitable consequence of viewing Christianity from a cultural-linguistic 
perspective.193 It is then fitting, that the prospective fides ex audito theory of 
salvation of the religious other sits well with Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic 
outlook. The language of Christ is according to Lindbeck at its heart not of the 
type of language which imprisons one ever more tightly in one’s tribe, but rather 
                                                
191 ND, 36, 66. 
192 See Dulles 2003, 57-61 for a critic of Lindbeck’s postmodernistic and relativistic tendencies 
attributed to the ND and Church in a Postliberal age. Lindbeck 2004 is Lindbeck’s reply to these 
charges. 
193 Lindbeck 2004, 15. 
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that of true humanity which witnesses the love of God.194 It witnesses in the world 
with the aim of absorbing humanity into the body of Christ. This tribe is probably 
above all the tribe Lindbeck wishes to increase. 
 
“The communication of the gospel is.. ..the offer and the act of sharing one’s own 
beloved language- the language that speaks of Jesus Christ- with all those who are 
interested, in the full awareness that God does not call all to be part of the 
witnessing people.”195 
 
This full awareness, which Lindbeck advocates, paradoxically verifies to the 
witnessing people that the salvation of the world does not depend ultimately on 
the witnessing people, but in what they witness: Christ. Christ alone saves to 
which the church pays humble witness as a cultural-linguistic manifestation or 
extension of Christ. Humility serves in this sense as a mode of witness in the 
postmodern context.  
This humility might at times entail encouraging people of different faiths to 
become better practitioners of their faith.196 In other words be more distinctly 
what one is: practice what one preaches more faithfully to where one is coming 
from. This entails the cultural-linguistic realism that in order to know who one is 
one must know how one is. One needs to know where one is coming from and 
become aware of what one is representing. Otherwise one does not necessarily 
know why one is witnessing to something in the first place. From this perspective, 
the concept of witness is central to how Lindbeck understands the relation 
between the church and the world, which also then has corollary implications for 
his understanding of the relation between the text, and the world. In order to then 
get a theologically encompassing understanding of how Lindbeck understands this 
relation, it would need to be discerned by taking into account his ecclesiology, to 






                                                
194 ND 60-61. 
195 ND, 61. 
196 ND, 54. 
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5. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the understanding of community in George 
Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine. Intrinsic to this question was also examining 
how Lindbeck understands the relation between the text and the world which both 
meet in a Christian community. Thirdly this study also aimed at understanding 
what the persuasiveness of this understanding depends on. The method applied for 
this task was systematic analysis. 
 The study was conducted by first providing an orientation into the 
nontheological substance of the ND which was assumed useful with respect to the 
aim of this study. The study then went on to explore Lindbeck in his own context 
of postliberal theology in order to see how the ND was received. It also attempted 
to provide a picture of how the ND relates to Lindbeck as a theologian. The third 
chapter was a descriptive analysis into the cultural-linguistic perspective, which is 
understood as being directly proportional to his understanding of community. The 
fourth chapter was an analysis into how the cultural-linguistic perspective sees the 
relation between the text and the world.     
  Lindbeck has been studied extensively. His reception in theological 
discourse was shown to be multifaceted. Its basic cultural-linguistic framework 
has diffused into theology to the extent that it has managed to put theology on a 
new track, which speaks on the behalf of the significance of ND. On the other 
hand the reception has also been very critical. Problems perceived in his cultural-
linguistic understanding of community have centered on how the given 
understanding provides/lacks tools for understanding the relation between the 
world and the text in a theologically meaningful way. It has led to charges of 
fideism, sectarianism, isolationism and relativism. 
Lindbeck’s understanding of community is above all a perspective into 
reality. Since it was initially put forward for the purposes of ecumenical dialogue, 
its aim was to make more understandable the reality in which doctrines function, 
which leads to understanding the nature of doctrine as regulative. From this angle 
it was to be perceived as a framework for dialogue.  
Lindbeck’s understanding of community is in itself a framework. When 
religion is understood from a cultural-linguistic perspective, it presents itself as a 
cultural-linguistic entity, which Lindbeck defines as a comprehensive interpretive 
scheme which structures human experience and understanding of oneself and the 
world in which one lives. When one exists in this entity, it is the entity which 
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shapes the subjectivities of all those who are at home in this entity which makes 
participation in the life of a cultural linguistic entity a condition for understanding 
it. For this reason the task of systematic theology is for Lindbeck to give a 
normative explication of the meaning a religion has for its cultural-linguistically 
bound followers. 
Language is the central analogy to understanding the medium in which one 
moves when inhabiting a cultural-linguistic system because language is the 
transmitting medium in which the cultural-linguistic system is embodied. They 
are mutually constitutive to its existence. It allows to understand why Lindbeck 
understands reality as being that of being situated amongst regulatory forces. One 
can master the Finnish language without understanding the logic of one’s correct 
application of words. Fluency is a derivative of having heard sound Finnish, 
which the person has put to good use. Recognizing grammatical errors becomes 
an inbuilt function of the competence ‘at home’ in one’s ear metaphorically 
speaking.  
The realism entailed in Lindbeck’s understanding of a community is that we 
are fundamentally on the receiving end also when it comes to our identities 
whether cultural or religious. We always witness to something, which can be seen 
displayed most vividly in the well-known example of the wolf children. Who we 
are is a reflection of the reality at the mercy of which one happens to be. In the 
case of the wolf children, what made them wolf children was essentially that they 
were not within the scope of cultural-linguistic system of humanity. The 
persuasiveness of Lindbeck’s understanding of community comes in this way 
from accepting the realism that whatever we are is always dependent on 
something that has brought about that identity. We are never left unpersuaded. 
The nature of religion correlates in this sense the general nature of our 
existence. Religion is above all an external word that moulds and shapes our 
religious existence and experience. Understanding faith then as coming from 
hearing, is something that correlates with the cultural-linguistic depiction of 
reality. Religion informs us of a religious reality. This externality linked to the 
axiomatic nature of religion is also something that distinguishes Lindbeck sharply 
from liberalist tendencies, which understand religion as ultimately expressing the 
prereflective depths of the inner self. Lindbeck sees this liberal conclusion as 
evidence of one having been persuaded by the premises of the modern paradigm 
in order to arrive at that conclusion. 
 71 
Once this external nature of religion has been established, what becomes of 
integral importance is how to verify the ontological understanding of truth inbuilt 
in the intrasystematic self-understandings of religions. In Lindbeck’s 
understanding it becomes discernable only in the performative-propositional 
appropriation of this truth which for him is a derivative of a theistic realism which 
holds that truth and knowledge of truth only coincide in God, because only in God 
are they directly known to correspond. Therefore understanding either gains or 
does not gain propositional force depending on whether its use corresponds with 
the ontological dimension of reality which exists independent of our perceptions 
of it. With respect to the ultimate truths of Christianity and assessing their 
correspondence to this independent reality, what Jesus said and what he did is of 
ultimate ontological significance in terms of truth, which theologically remains an 
ontological mystery. But precisely because of what this mystery is understood to 
entail in accordance with to the words and deeds of Christ testified to in the Bible, 
it is ontologically embodied in Christ and therefore verifiable from the fruit of a 
community that seeks to witness Christ. Successful witnessing in this sense is an 
ontological derivative of the extent the community manages to witness Christ’s 
success on the cross. Only this type of success up-builds the Christian community 
in a God-willed way. 
When Lindbeck speaks of Christianity as an external word, he means it a 
way that has numerous implications for how this external word relates to our 
cultural-linguistic reality in general. When this external word is thought of as 
analogous to a language, it transmits the reality of a new being in the same way as 
a language embodies a certain cultural reality. This new being is man (as a fallen 
creature) being created anew through Christ. For Lindbeck it is something that is 
for heuristic purposes comparable to “the jump, which was the coming into being 
of man”.  If linguistic capability for Sellars, who Lindbeck refers to in the above 
quote, unleashed the power of human thought, Lindbeck wants to say that 
language that speaks of Christ unleashes the power of divine thought. This way of 
understanding the language of Christ renders man’s preconceptions invalid for the 
same reason as why Sellars concludes the coming into being of a man as an 
irreducible event. Therefore, the language of Christ is a self-sustaining and 
irreducible cultural-linguistic entity, which is ontologically founded in none other 
than Christ. This ontologically founded cultural linguistic entity is also what 
constitutes the ‘sense of the faithful’ which determined the formation of the 
 72 
canon, which in turn, as an intratextual deposit, informs and therefore shapes the 
sense of the faithful of a Christian community which believes in the 
eschatological decisiveness of Jesus Christ. Thus the canon has ultimate authority 
over the community rendering the authority practised by the community 
propositional and corporate by nature.  
In this respect Lindbeck is not only Lutheran, but also much like Luther in 
his epistemic thinking when it comes to the role of a priori notions of God. Luther 
rejected any notion whereby man has any natural ability to determine the true 
nature of God. For Luther, it is precisely the cross, which educates Christians by 
permeating the home and origin of their incompetence in this crucial respect. 
Lindbeck expresses the dependence of the cultural-linguistic system 
communicating the message of salvation to the ontological reality of salvation in 
his prospective theory of salvation. According to it one must learn the language of 
faith in order to be within the reality where one can either surrender to or reject 
the message of salvation rendered in Christ. This does not imply a relativism that 
the message of salvation or damnation has validity only amongst those who are 
aware of it. It has universal validity, which is the basic motive for witnessing to 
the message of salvation, but the validity of this universality is only 
understandable through the language of Christ i.e. which ontologically means 
Christ for Lindbeck. The language of Christ renders the message of salvation in 
Christ and so a Christian community is witnessing to the rendering presence of 
Christ. The church as the body of Christ is the home of hearing this message 
correlating with the church as the home of the external word (both preached and 
in the form of the sacraments). Therefore the basic relation to the world for a 
Christian is that of witnessing salvation in Christ: witnessing Christ as the home 
of hearing the message of salvation. Following this logic, the relation of the world 
and the text is one of relating to the world from the text, i.e. In Christ through the 
word (text) for the world, because it assumes it’s logic from the way Christ 
ontologically relates to us.  
Lindbeck’s understanding of community is not ultimately something 
derived from the non-theological ideas he uses to reflect his understanding of 
community, but from the way the reality of Christ seems to function in the reality 
depicted in scripture. This is most clearly depicted in the prospective theory of 
salvation of the religious other Lindbeck advocates which builds of Paul’s ‘faith 
comes from hearing the external word’. The sociological, anthropological and 
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philosophical import introduced somewhat in chapter 1.2 which implicitly 
undergird the heuristic dimensions of Lindbeck’s argumentation throughout for 
example in the way that hearing can be understood as internalisation, have been 
adapted to serve in verifying a realism which Lindbeck sees evidence of in 
Scripture. In this sense the ND is a test of their viability and the reception of the 
ND serves as the primary indicator of how well they work. It is evident that it 
raises a lot of questions as seen in chapter 2, but that it has provoked a wide-
ranging discussion can be seen as evidence of it having depicted the nature of 
reality in a way that has touched theology profoundly. It came close enough to 
bring about a phenomena of resonance, if one may be permitted to use an idiom in 
this context.  
On a concluding note, I recall a lecture series here in the university of 
Helsinki a few years back where the topic was atonement. It was clear from the 
student’s opinions that some held certain doctrinal perspectives into this very 
difficult question as far more dear than others. It was also evident, that they were 
dear precisely because they were what rendered the substance to one and for this 
reason they are in their instrumental significance of indispensable value, i.e. one 
felt at home with a certain perspective. Ecumenical dialogue from a cultural-
linguistic perspective between Christians is challenging and difficult because it is 
very real. In contrast to the situation in inter-religious dialogue, where one can 
cultural-linguistically clearly find it in one’s own religious identity to identify the 
religious other as an other, Christians are of the same religion and understanding 
differences becomes fore mostly a hermeneutical question of encountering 
otherness amongst one’s own. Since all Christian churches confess Christ, it is not 
always a case of what is the religious substance of one’s religion, but rather how 
this substance is understood, that divides. Understanding these divisions requires 
shifting attention to the paradigms, which constitute the logical or grammatical 
dimensions of doctrine. At this point, dialogue becomes far more challenging in 
that it begins to concern those aspects of understanding, which are in their 
regulative role rather immediate for understanding, and for this reason very dear 
to one. Whilst the world can often be heard shouting, “kill your darlings” in the 
name of paving the way forward for compromise, it does not apply to theology or 
ecumenism because it is concerned with questions of ultimate importance.  
An intrinsic problem in Lindbeck’s understanding of community does seem 
to persist even though the cultural linguistic perspective makes evident that our 
 74 
identities as Christians are only understandable in the light of the historical 
formation of this identity, an therefore as derivatives of the cultural-linguistic 
deposit guiding this identity. The problem is it does not put forward as such very 
much in the way of criteria concerning how one is to account for the historical 
footing of the sense of the faithful (sensus fidelium) intrinsic to the intratextual 
world of the canon which guides the Christian community in its history. What one 
feels this problem facilitates is a need for some type of criteria which can help 
with the task of distinguishing what is historically conditioned prejudice and what 
is simply a given with respect to the sense of the faithful in the canon. This may 
be too much required of any model, but questions like to what extent and based on 
what criteria historical criticism could be utilised in this crucially important task 
remain difficult questions. Based on this short study all one can conclude with 
respect to this deficiency in the ND is that humility constitutes the way forward in 
one way or another. 
Personally this study proved particularly fruitful because my initial 
attraction to Lindbeck was based on a thoroughly mistaken apprehension that 
Lindbeck’s understanding of community was a derivative of the non-theological 
cultural-linguistic import it possesses. Those aspects resonated with personal 
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